Afonso Matos (Masters in European Union Law from the School of Law of University of Minho)

Throughout 2025, the European Commission presented ten Omnibus packages with one central objective: to simplify European Union legislation, primarily by reducing the administrative costs and reporting obligations imposed on European companies, with a view to strengthening technological competitiveness.[1] This action favours faster procedures, less formalism and a reduction in regulatory fragmentation. However, the logic underlying this simplex, which is now presented as a “novelty”, has already been adopted in a different area, without much publicity, namely immigration and asylum policy. Here, the fluidity between criminal law and administrative law is a constant, with the legislator’s final option – in the name of simplification and speed – being to deal with all issues under the umbrella of administrative law. Observing this, experts analyse the phenomenon through the expression crimmigration.   

To understand this phenomenon, however, it is essential to revisit the evolution of the European immigration regime. The issue began to gain prominence in the 1980s, when the Schengen acquis led several Member States to abolish internal border controls, thus creating an area based on free movement and residence within European territory. And because this movement also included third-country nationals, it became clear that there was a need for coordinated external border control capable of responding to the expected increase in transnational crime.[2]

Nonetheless, it was not until the Treaty of Amsterdam – effective 1999 – that the Union acquired a formal mandate in this area,[3] when it set the goal of establishing itself as an area of freedom, security and justice, supported by measures relating to external border control, asylum and immigration.[4] Matters which were consolidated as common policies with the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009.[5]

What happens is that the common immigration policy is developing in two areas: regular and irregular migration. That said, due to various factors, but mainly globalisation and the increased visibility of migratory flows, irregular migration has been portrayed as a security issue, not only by Member States but also by the Union itself, which has focused primarily on preventing the arrival of irregular migrants and removing those already on its territory.[6]

It is in this context that what is known as the securitisation of immigration has emerged.[7] According to the Copenhagen School, securitisation means presenting an issue as an existential threat in order to legitimise the use of exceptional measures to deal with that threat.[8] This is precisely what has happened: immigration has increasingly been described as a reality that requires an urgent response in order to preserve the integrity of the European territory,[9] shifting from the realm of common policy to that of exception.[10]

At the national level, three major threats associated with migrants were constructed: one related to identity, based on the fear that cultural differences compromise the heritage of the indigenous population;[11] another economic, based on the idea that migrants seek only to benefit from state social benefits; and a third related  to work, marked by the fear of job losses in the face of competition from the migrant working class.[12] At the supranational level, the threat is constructed in Union documents that alternately use expressions that reinforce the perception that the number of migrants may exceed the response capacity of States or that migratory movements are linked to organised crime, terrorism and trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings.[13]

Within the Union, migration has therefore been associated with criminal practices and radicalisation, something that, at Member State level, is further amplified by social institutions such as the media and far-right populist parties. These, in turn, driven by their own interests, fuel the narrative of a direct link between immigration and crime.[14]

In other words, both at national and supranational level, there is a discursive dimension to the criminalisation of migration, which generally translates into immigrants being held responsible for most criminal activities[15] and becomes relevant insofar as the constant repetition of these ideas facilitates their acceptance and, consequently, legitimises the application of extraordinary punitive measures,[16] which is precisely where crimmigration fits in.

But what does this phenomenon of crimmigration entail? Well, the concept was coined by American author Juliet Stumpf to describe the fusion between immigration law and criminal law[17] that began to be observed in the United States in the 1990s and 2000s,[18] operating in two ways: on the one hand, the convergence of the domain of immigration law with that of criminal law, with the application of immigration rules to those convicted of crimes, such as permanent expulsion from the territory; and, on the other hand, the criminalisation of immigration law, with the application of criminal rules to migrants who had not committed any crime.[19] According to Stumpf, this fusion was based on a notion of membership, insofar as both branches of law define, each in their own way, who is recognised as a member of the community, creating categories of inclusion and exclusion, namely between “legal” and “illegal” and between innocent and guilty.[20]

Another relevant author, also American, is David Sklansky, who attributes the emergence of crimmigration to an ad hoc instrumentalism, that is, a logic that treats norms and procedures as interchangeable tools and which, in crimmigration, translates into the possibility of treating a migrant’s behaviour as a crime or not, depending on the usefulness of that option in achieving migration goals.[21] In effect, Sklansky argues that crimmigration stems from the fact that, in the face of growing global pressure against immigration, this instrumentalist aspect of the intersection between criminal law and immigration law offers a solution with high logistical efficiency and speed[22] by allowing the combination of the lower density of guarantees and rights in immigration law. This, in turn, broadens the State’s margin of discretion, with the deterrent weight of the generally more severe sanctions of criminal law.[23]

Although the literature is predominantly North American, where the concept was originally formulated, it is important to emphasise that this phenomenon has spread to Europe, albeit with its own characteristics, according to Dutch authors Maartje van der Woude and Joanne van der Leun. Firstly, it should be noted that in the Union, crimmigration goes beyond the fusion of immigration law and criminal law, also integrating social dynamics;[24] and, secondly, that instrumentalism is more systematic, not functioning as in the United States, on a case-by-case basis, but through decision-making patterns that prioritise the control of mobility.[25] Furthermore, and because Member States refuse to transfer the power to punish to the Union,[26] the Union’s action is carried out through the national criminal laws, via harmonisation mechanism,[27] and administrative sanctions.[28]

Thus, the practices most frequently identified as expressions of crimmigration in the Union are: i) enhanced surveillance of external borders; ii) the imposition of administrative and criminal sanctions on third parties who interact with irregular migrants; and iii) detention used both for removal and for the processing of asylum applications.

Starting with border surveillance, it is worth remembering that, following the wave of Al-Qaeda attacks in the early 2000s, the European Union concluded that physical borders were no longer sufficient to control irregular mobility[29] and decided to move towards the digitisation of borders through biometrics,[30] i.e. technologies that identify each person based on their biological characteristics.[31] In this way, the border became “inscribed” on the migrant themselves,[32] whose biometric data is collected by national authorities and integrated into central European systems such as SIS, Eurodac and VIS, where it is compared with existing records, enabling the authorities to verify, in the event of a match, whether the individual has previously been identified in a Member State.[33]

However, this infrastructure raises crimmigratory issues, because: i) biometrics used to manage mobility has historically been associated with the criminal domain;[34] ii) the SIS, Eurodac and VIS databases have been transformed over time into criminal investigation tools with access being opened up to law enforcement authorities and the type of data stored being expanded;[35]^/[36]^/[37] and iii) these same databases have been interconnected on the grounds that, by allowing rapid access to relevant information and identification of security risks, this interconnection strengthens the fight against terrorism and crime.[38]

Moving on to sanctions imposed on third parties, it should be noted that this crimmigration practice differs from the others in that it is presented as a measure that claims to protect migrants, who are portrayed as defenceless victims of third parties seeking to take advantage of their vulnerability, but which in reality harms them by reinforcing the violent border regime to which they are subjected.[39] In this area, European Union legislation focuses mainly on two areas: assistance with entry and residence, and assistance with employment.

With regard to assistance with entry and residence, criminalisation stems from the so-called “Facilitators’ Package”, which classifies assistance with irregular entry, transit and residence as a crime, on the assumption that such assistance constitutes smuggling.[40] Thus, as in the case of assistance with entry and transit, financial or material gain is not required for criminalisation – as is the case with assistance with residence[41]^/[42] –, even acts motivated by altruism can be criminalised, giving rise to so-called “crimes of solidarity”,[43] the purpose of which is solely to discourage contact between nationals and migrants[44] and further isolate the latter.[45]

With regard to employment, crimmigration stems from Directive 2009/52/EC, which prohibits the hiring of irregular migrants[46] and imposes control obligations on employers,[47] under penalty of administrative sanctions[48] and, in the presence of aggravating circumstances, criminal sanctions.[49]^/[50] Although one of the stated objectives is to protect workers from abuse by requiring Member States to establish effective mechanisms for migrants to lodge complaints against employers,[51] the protection offered is extremely limited and temporary,[52] so that many, fearing expulsion during the proceedings, end up not reporting degrading working conditions.[53] This only demonstrates that the priority of the Directive is not, in fact, the protection of workers, but rather the containment of irregular migration,[54] by preventing access to income on which many migrants depend to survive in the new territory.[55]^/[56]

Finally, with detention being used both for the removal of irregular migrants and for the processing of asylum applications, crimmigration arises from the fact that the Union describes this measure as administrative, when, based on an analysis of the Return Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive, which regulate this form of detention, it is clear that we are, in fact, dealing with a measure of a criminal nature. Indeed, a strong presumption of punitive intent results from its functions, namely: i) deterrence, when detention is justified by the risk of absconding, revealing the intention to limit irregular entry and stay or to pressure migrants to comply with the removal procedure;  ii) retribution, when detention is justified by the migrant’s alleged obstruction of the preparation of their return, functioning as a reaction against them for their lack of cooperation;[57] and iii) incapacitation, when detention is justified by the protection of public order, based on the logic that migrants, due to their socio-economic vulnerability, are more likely to break the law.[58]

This criminal nature is, in turn, not ruled out by the level of severity of the measure, given that both directives allow detention in prisons in the absence of specialised centres[59] and authorise prolonged periods of deprivation of liberty.[60]

Furthermore, the presentation of detention as a measure of mere administrative convenience is particularly relevant in the context of crimmigration, as it allows for the removal of procedural guarantees specific to criminal law, namely, and in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the essential guarantees of a fair trial provided for in Article 6 of the ECHR,[61] including the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings, and the rights to silence and not to incriminate oneself.[62]

All of this leads to a clear conclusion: European decision-makers resort to the rhetoric of administrative convenience to legitimise instruments that, in practice, are criminal in nature, thus avoiding the guarantees that such instruments require. This confirms the instrumentalism described by Sklansky and, at the same time, the interpretation of van der Woude and van der Leun, who argue that, unlike in the United States, this instrumentalism in Europe assumes a structural form, with crimmigration embedded from the outset in the legal norms, which are designed on the basis of the marginalisation of irregular migrants. 

It is precisely in the theses of Sklansky, van der Woude and van der Leun that we find the logic that today emerges explicitly in the so-called Omnibus packages: that of regulatory simplification as the dominant criterion of governance. In this context, two packages in particular are worth highlighting. Firstly, the so-called “Defence Readiness Package”, which seeks to establish a mindset of defence preparedness throughout the European Union, based on the premise that threats at the borders are growing at an accelerated pace, while European industrial and institutional capacity remains inadequate and outdated,[63] and which can therefore be read in the light of the securitisation process. Secondly, the so-called “Digital Package”, which, by promoting more effective use of personal data and greater integration of IT systems,[64] resembles the sphere of external border digitisation, in which a central role is assigned to large European information systems for the collection, storage, processing and interconnection of personal data.

The problem in the context of crimmigration is that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice cannot be reduced to its security dimension, as it is also linked to the fundamental values of the Union: among them, democracy and the rule of law. These values have been compromised by the regulatory simplification resulting from crimmigration, particularly in its instrumental dimension, which distorts the system of legal guarantees in the name of efficient migration control, in an area where every decision has particularly severe consequences. In view of this, although the Union must, of course, be able to protect itself, this protection cannot be guided solely by securitisation. It is essential to promote a new balance between security and fundamental rights to ensure that the response to migration does not jeopardise the principles that structure the European legal system.[65]

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[1] European Council & Council of the European Union, “Simplification of EU rules”, accessed December 29, 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/simplification/.

[2] Monika Kabata, “The intersection of counter-terrorism, migration and border control policies in the European Union: the securitisation of migration?” (PhD diss., Nottingham Trent University, 2022), 53.

[3] Martin Wagner, Alan Desmond and Albert Kraler, “MIrreM Working Paper No 8/2024: EU Policy Framework on irregular migrants”, Measuring Irregular Migration, April 2024, 13, https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/61067/file/MIRREM%2520Working%2520Paper_EU%2520Policy%2520Framework%2520on%2520irregular%2520migrants.pdf.

[4] Nuno Piçarra, “Espaço de liberdade, segurança e justiça”, in Enciclopédia da União Europeia, ed.  Ana Paula Brandão et al. (Vila Franca de Xira: Petrony, 2017), 169.

[5] António Vitorino, “Artigo 67.º TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa anotado e comentado, ed. Manuel Lopes Porto and Gonçalo Anastácio (Coimbra: Almedina, 2012), 372.

[6] Wagner, Desmond and Kraler, ““MIrreM Working Paper No 8/2024: EU Policy Framework on irregular migrants”, 13.

[7] Matija Frčko and Davor Solomun, “Securitization of migration and migration policy in the European Union”, in Criminal justice and security in Central and Eastern Europe: from common sense to evidence-based policy-making, Conference Proceedings (Maribor: University of Maribor Press, 2018), 350.

[8] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and, Jaap de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 21.

[9] Nafisa Abdulhamid, “The securitization of immigration in the European Union: a new (cultural) racism”, Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS), v. 9 (2018): 48, accessed December 29, 2025, url:https://uottawa.scholarsportal.info/ottawa/index.php/potentia/article/view/4442.

[10] Frčko and Solomun, “Securitization of migration and migration policy in the European Union”, 350.

[11] Salih Turgay and Pelin Sönmez, Migration as a securitized phenomenon: an analysis of the societal security in terms of EU perception (Eskişehir: Eskisehir Osmangazi University, 2024), 279-284.

[12] Noora Mattsson, “Securitization of immigrants – and its political impacts on European Union” (Master’s diss., Charles University, 2016), 16.

[13] Felicia Matz Wennerhed, “The securitization of migrants – a critical discourse analysis of migration in EU policy” (Bachelor’s diss., Lund University, 2016), 21-23.

[14] Joanna Parkin, “The criminalisation of migration in Europe. a state-of-the-art of the academic literature and research”, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), no. 61 (2013): 5, accessed December 29, 2025, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2350119.

[15] Salvatore Palidda, “A review of the principal European countries”, in Racial criminalization of migrants in the 21st century (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 23.

[16] Parkin, “The criminalisation of migration in Europe. a state-of-the-art of the academic literature and research”, 2-3.

[17] Juliet Stumpf, “The crimmigration crisis: immigrants, crime, and sovereign power”, American University Law Review, v. 56, no. 2 (2006): 376, accessed December 29, 2025, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=935547.

[18] Cristina Fernández-Bessa, José Ángel Brandariz and Elisa García España, “Current debates on immigration, crime, and penality: an introduction”, Revista Española de Investigación Criminológica, v. 18, no. 2 (2020): 5, accessed December 29, 2025, https://ruc.udc.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams/39cf00ea-05ed-429e-912e-a2e963a60f0d/content.

[19] Maria João Guia and João Pedroso, “A insustentável resposta da «crimigração» face à irregularidade dos migrantes: uma perspetiva da União Europeia”, Revista Interdisciplinar da Mobilidade Humana, v. 23, no. 45, (2015): 132, accessed December 29, 2025, url:https://www.scielo.br/j/remhu/a/BqMJgwkHB6QnxWgdryfDVBc/?format=pdf&lang=pt.

[20] Stumpf, “The crimmigration crisis: immigrants, crime, and sovereign power”, 380.

[21] David Alan Sklansky, “Crime, immigration, and ad hoc instrumentalism”, New Criminal Law Review, v. 15, no. 2, (2012): 161, accessed December 29, 2025, https://online.ucpress.edu/nclr/article/15/2/157/68736/Crime-Immigration-and-Ad-hoc-Instrumentalism.

[22] José Ángel Brandariz, “Criminalization or instrumentalism? New trends in the field of border criminology”, Theoretical Criminology, v. 26, no. 2 (2021): 290, accessed December 29, 2025, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/13624806211009158.

[23] J. Brouwer, Detection, detention, deportation: criminal justice and migration control through the lens of crimmigration (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2020), 12.

[24] Maartje van der Woude and Joanne van der Leun, “A reflection on crimmigration in the Netherlands: on the cultural security complex and the impact of framing”, in Social control and justice: crimmigration in the age of fear (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2013), 43.

[25] Brandariz, “Criminalization or instrumentalism? New trends in the field of border criminology”, 289.

[26] Mário Ferreira Monte, O direito penal europeu de “Roma” a “Lisboa” – subsídios para a sua legitimação (Lisboa: Quid Juris, 2009), 112.

[27] Anabela Miranda Rodrigues, O direito penal europeu emergente (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2008), 87-88.

[28] Rodrigues, O direito penal europeu emergente, 83.

[29] Philippa Metcalfe, «“It’s not a bug, it’s a feature”; control and injustice in datafied borders» (PhD diss., Cardiff University, Cardiff, 2022), 27.

[30] Lillie Hafner, «Capturing “the crimmigrant”: empirical evidence of crimmigration in the digitalization of EU migration management» (Bachelor’s diss., Twente University, 2023), 6.

[31] Anastasia Sarantopoulou, “Biometrics at the gate: an assessment of EU’s biometrical borders” (Master’s diss., Tilburg University, 2021), 17-18.

[32] Aleš Završnik, “The European digital fortress and large biometric EU IT systems: border criminology, technology, and human rights”, Two Homelands, no. 49 (2019): 57, accessed December 29, 2025, https://ojs.zrc-sazu.si/twohomelands/article/view/7253.

[33] Valeria Ferraris, “Entangled in the technology-driven borderscape: border crossers rendered to their digital self”, European Journal of Criminology, v. 20, no. 5 (2023): 1745-1746, accessed December 29, 2025, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14773708221086717.

[34] Nina Amelung, «“Crimmigration control” across borders: the convergence of migration and crime control through transnational biometric databases”, Historical Social Research, v. 46, no. 3 (2021): 158, accessed December 29, 2025, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27075121.

[35] Giray Sadik and Ceren Kaya, “The role of surveillance technologies in the securitization of EU migration policies and border management”, Uluslararasi Iliskiler, v. 17, no. 68 (2020): 152, accessed December 29, 2025, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1497664.

[36] Maria Benedita Queiroz, “Illegally staying in the EU: an analysis of illegality in EU migration law” (PhD diss., European University Institute, 2015), 183-184.

[37] Tim Dekkers, “Technology driven crimmigration? Function creep and mission creep in Dutch migration control”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, v. 46, no. 9 (2019): 1850, accessed December 29, 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1674134.

[38] Lauren Elrick, “Finding the balance between security and human rights in the EU border security ecosystem”, European Journal of Law and Technology, v. 12, no. 1 (2021): 23, accessed December 29, 2025, url:https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/finding-the-balance-between-security-and-human-rights-in-the-eu-b/.

[39] Deanna Dadusc and Pierpaolo Mudu, “Care without control: the humanitarian industrial complex and the criminalisation of solidarity”, Geopolitics, v. 27, no. 4 (2022): 1210-1212, accessed December 29, 2025, url:https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2020.1749839.

[40] Maurizio Ambrosini and Minke Hajer, Irregular migration: IMISCOE short reader (Berlin: Springer, 2023), 88.

[41] Article 1(1) of Directive 2002/90/EC.

[42] Cristina Pugnale, “Humanitarian human smuggling: the European and Italian anti-smuggling legislation” (Diss., University of Graz, 2019), 41-42.

[43] Meral Balci and Ceren Karagözoğlu, “The problem of the criminalisation of humanitarian aid in the context of the 2002 European Union Directive and Framework Decision on strengthening the criminal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence”, Journal of Penal Law and Criminology, v. 11, no. 2 (2023): 207, accessed December 29, 2025, https://iupress.istanbul.edu.tr/en/journal/jplc/article/izinsizgiris-gecis-ve-ikametin-kolaylastirilmasini-onlemek-icin-cezai-cercevenin-guclendirilmesine-iliskin-2002-tarihli-avrupa-birligi-direktifi-ve-cerceve-kararibaglaminda-insani-yardimin-cezalandirilabilirligi-sorunu.

[44] Valsamis Mitsilegas, “The changing landscape of the criminalisation of migration in Europe: The protective function of European Union law”, in Social Control and justice: crimmigration in the age of fear (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2013), 94.

[45] World Organisation Against Torture, “Europa: cerco a la solidaridad. Análisis de los patrones de criminalización de la solidaridad através de las voces de quienes defienden los derechos de las personas migrantes”, November 2021, accessed December 29, 2025, https://www.omct.org/site-resources/legacy/Europa-Cerco-a-la-Solidaridad_2021-11-15-150021_tdsp.pdf.

[46] Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/52/EC.

[47] Article 4(1) of Directive 2009/52/EC.

[48] Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Directive 2009/52/EC.

[49] Articles 9(1) and 10(1) of Directive 2009/52/EC.

[50] Constança Urbano de Sousa, “Directiva 2009/52/CE – 18 junio 2009 – sanciones empleadores de nacionales de terceros países en situación irregular” (paper presented at the annual meeting for the European Immigration Lawyers Network, Santander, Spain, 17-19 April, 2015), 1.

[51] Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/52/EC.

[52] Article 13(4) of Directive 2009/52/EC.

[53] Sousa, “Directiva 2009/52/CE – 18 junio 2009 – sanciones empleadores de nacionales de terceros países en situación irregular”, 8-10.

[54] Sousa, “Directiva 2009/52/CE – 18 junio 2009 – sanciones empleadores de nacionales de terceros países en situación irregular”, 7.

[55] Oleg M. Yaroshenko et. al, “Combating the illegal employment of third-country nationals in the Member States of the European Union”, Krytyka Prawa, v. 14, no. 2 (2022): 209, accessed December 29, 2025, https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=1062266.

[56] Anna Iermano, “The new EU action plan against migrant smuggling as a «renewed» response to the emerging challenges”, in International Migration and the Law, ed. Angela Di Stasi, Ida Caracciolo, Giovanni Cellamare, Pietro Gargiulo (London: Routledge, 2024), 527.

[57] Izabella Majcher, “The effectiveness of the EU return policy at all costs: the punitive use of administrative pre-removal detention”, Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, v. 81 (2020): 113-116, accessed December 29, 2025, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-43732-9_6.

[58] Majcher, “The effectiveness of the EU return policy at all costs: the punitive use of administrative pre-removal detention”, 117.

[59] Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC and article 12(1) of Directive (EU) 2024/1346.

[60] Article 15(6) of Directive 2008/115/EC and article 11(1) of Directive (EU) 2024/1346.

[61] Stella Afxentiou, “Immigration detention in Europe as an expression of crimmigration: interactions, tensions and complementarity between EU law and the ECHR” (Thesis: University of Cyprus, 2024), 41-44,  https://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/entities/publication/b171f783-cacb-482f-8ee6-8d3cd3fc375e.  

[62] Lorenzo Bernardini, Administrative immigration detention as a punitive measure: is it time for a new standpoint? (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2023), 256-257.

[63] European Commission, “Defence readiness Omnibus: simplification proposal to boost industrial readiness”, accessed December 29, 2025, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/defence-readiness-omnibus_en.

[64] European Commission, “Digital Package”, accessed December 29, 2025, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/faqs/digital-package.

[65] Roila Mavrouli, “The challenge of today’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: a re-appropriation of the balance between claims of national security and fundamental rights”, Rivista quadrimestrale on line sullo Spazio europeo di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia, no. 2 (2019): 118, accessed December 29, 2025, https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7055657.

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