The EU Directive on violence against women and domestic violence – fixing the loopholes in the Artificial Intelligence Act

Inês Neves (Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Porto | Researcher at CIJ | Member of the Jean Monnet Module team DigEUCit) 
           

March 2024: a significant month for both women and Artificial Intelligence

In March 2024 we celebrate women. But March was not only the month of women. It was also a historic month for AI regulation. And, as #TaylorSwiftAI has shown us,[1] they have a lot more in common than you might think.

On 13 March 2024, the European Parliament approved the Artificial Intelligence Act,[2] a European Union (EU) Regulation proposed by the European Commission back in 2021. While the law has yet to be published in the Official Journal of the EU, it is fair to say that it makes March 2024 a historical month for Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’) regulation.

In addition to the EU’s landmark piece of legislation, the Council of Europe’s path towards the first legally binding international instrument on AI has also made progress with the finalisation of the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law.[3] As the EU’s cornerstone legislation, this will be a ‘first of its kind’, aiming to uphold the Council of Europe’s legal standards on human rights, democracy and the rule of law in relation to the regulation of AI systems. With its finalisation by the Committee on Artificial Intelligence, the way is now open for future signature at a later stage. While the non-self-executing nature of its provisions is to be expected, some doubts remain as to its full potential, given the high level of generality of its provisions, and their declarative nature.[4]

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Editorial of March 2024

By the Alessandra Silveira 

On inferred personal data and the difficulties of EU law in dealing with this matter

The right not to be subject to automated decisions was considered for the first time before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the recent SCHUFA judgment. Article 22 GDPR (on individual decisions based solely on automated processing, including profiling) always raised many doubts to legal scholars:[1] i) what a decision taken “solely” on the basis of automated processing would be?; ii) would this Article provide for a right or, rather, a general prohibition whose application does not require the party concerned to actively invoke a right?; iii) to what extent this automated decision produces legal effects or significantly affects the data subject in a similar manner?; iv) will the provisions of Article 22 GDPR only apply where there is no relevant human intervention in the decision-making process?; v) if a human being examines and weighs other factors when making the final decision, will it not be made “solely” based on the automated processing? [and, in this situation, will the prohibition in Article 22(1) GDPR not apply]?

To these doubts a German court has added a few more. SCHUFA is a private company under German law which provides its contractual partners with information on the creditworthiness of third parties, in particular, consumers. To that end, it establishes a prognosis on the probability of a future behaviour of a person (‘score’), such as the repayment of a loan, based on certain characteristics of that person, on the basis of mathematical and statistical procedures. The establishment of scores (‘scoring’) is based on the assumption that, by assigning a person to a group of other persons with comparable characteristics who have behaved in a certain way, similar behaviour can be predicted.[2]

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The Italy–Albania Protocol on migration management: between new schemes of asylum externalisation and risks of systematic violations

Valentina Faggiani (Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at University of Granada) 
           

The trend towards the externalisation of migratory policy has been reaffirmed in the recent Italy–Albania Protocol, whose objective is to institute a new model. This Protocol aims at intervening to overcome a real problem: the systemic crisis of asylum that Italy is suffering. The idea that inspires it and the scheme are clear and have some original profiles: if the situation in the reception centres in Italy is unsustainable, why not transfer migrants in irregular situation and asylum seekers to reception centres instituted outside the Italian territory, but managed, controlled and financed by Italy? In this country, particularly in frontline areas such as Lampedusa, on the one hand, foreigners suffer serious and systematic violations of fundamental rights; on the other hand, there has been a strong feeling of uneaseamong the local population, who live in an unsafe environment characterised by the proliferation of criminality and situation of violence.

The idea has the characteristic of extrema ratio: the purpose of building a new model of migratory flux management. Regarding the innovation profiles, it is interesting to observe that in this case Italy does is not delegating, as it did in the Memorandum of Understanding with Libia, the liability for controlling the fluxes and for pushing back the migrants to their country of origin, but it assumes the management of all phases, and it extends the jurisdiction and the cost that it implies. It is a much more extensive and complex project. Indeed, the political and economic context of Albania apparently offers more guarantees than other countries.

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Summaries of judgments: OT v Council of the European Union | Abramovich v Council

Summaries of judgments made in collaboration with the Portuguese judges and référendaire of the General Court (Maria José Costeira, Ricardo Silva Passos and Esperança Mealha)
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Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition), 15 November 2023, Case T-193/22, OT v Council of the European Union

Facts

Following the military aggression perpetrated by the Russian Federation (‘Russia’) against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Council of the European Union (‘the Council’) adopted several acts by which it added the applicant’s name to the lists of persons, entities and bodies supporting actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, adopted by the Council since 2014.

The Council imposed on the applicant, OT, a businessman of Russian nationality, the freezing of his banking funds and assets, in accordance with Article 2(1) (d) and (g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014[1], on the ground that, he is a major shareholder of the Russian conglomerate ‘Alfa Group’, one of Russia’s largest taxpayers. As such, the applicant is considered to be one of the most influential persons in the country and has links with the Russian President. According to the Council, Vladimir Putin rewarded the Alfa Group for its loyalty to the Russian authorities.

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