On the triggering of the EU’s conditionality mechanism: what has been done and what could follow

Gonçalo Martins de Matos (Master in Judiciary Law by the University of Minho)
 

            When the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered, at the beginning of the last year, the two landmark judgements Hungary v. Parliament and Council (Case C-156/21) and Poland v. Parliament and Council (Case C-157/21), the conditionality mechanism created by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 for the protection of the Union’s budget[1] definitely gained the green light for its implementation, in the sequence of which the Commission adopted the guidelines of application of said mechanism. On 27 April of the same year, the European Commission formally announced it would be triggering the conditionality mechanism against Hungary. After an intense period of negotiations between Brussels and Budapest, the European Commission adopted, on 18 September, a proposal on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary[2] (COM(2022) 485 final), following which the Council of the EU adopted, on 18 September, an implementing decision on the measures proposed by the Commission.

            Before we proceed with the analysis of the proposed measures and their impacts on the protection of the rule of law, we must briefly provide the necessary legal framework. As we have discussed before, the intention behind the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 is “the protection of the Union budget in the case of breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the Member States”, as is set out in Article 1 of the same Regulation. Article 3 of this Regulation establishes situations that may indicate a breach of the principles of the rule of law, and Article 4 stipulates the conditions for the adoption of the necessary measures to protect the same principles. Article 5 lays down the measures that can be adopted in case the Commission finds that the principles of the rule of law have been breached under the described terms, following the procedure set out in Article 6 of the Regulation. We further add that Article 5(3) enshrines a principle of proportionality when adopting those protective measures. Article 6(1) determines that the Commission may resort to the conditionality mechanism unless it considers that other procedures set out in Union legislation would allow it to protect the Union budget more effectively. Seeing that the European Commission has already resorted to Article 7 TEU and to several infringement procedures regarding the Hungarian government’s various breaches, the conditions were met to activate the conditionality regime.

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A new strategy for EU law enforcement

By Pedro Pereira (Master’s student in European Union Law at the School of Law of the University of Minho)

The European Commission is regarded as the “Guardian of the Treaties” in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), and according to its most recent Communication last October 13, it plans to ensure its own role with both a helping hand and watchful eye, all while honouring democratic transparency and (especially) EU law.

The Communication “Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers”[1] draws on the fact that the EU is an established community of both law and values. It reminds us that the EU’s best asset is its ability to create a homogenous background for its citizens and businesses alike. EU law lays the foundation and groundwork for a well-functioning internal market, for a more digital and greener Europe, ensures and promotes European values, provides for effective judicial cooperation, security and ultimately succeeds in showing the world the bastion of justice, democracy, and respect for fundamental rights. And bearing the responsibility as the Guardian of the Treaties and EU law, in its own words: “The Commission is committed to stepping up its work to promote and uphold people’s rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.”

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Can a judge’s request for a preliminary ruling be illegal and lead to disciplinary action? – The Court of Justice conclusions in case C-564/19

By Joana Gama Gomes (Master in International and European Law from the University of Coimbra / Researcher at CIDEEFF - Centro de Investigação em Direito Europeu, Económico, Financeiro e Fiscal)

The request for a preliminary ruling was submitted by a Hungarian court in criminal proceedings brought against a Swedish national, for infringement of the provisions of Hungarian law governing the acquisition or transport of firearms or ammunition. Although the facts of this case seem unrelated to the problem at hand, subsequent developments in Hungary during the course of this procedure raised a fundamental issue of EU law.

A declaration of illegality from the Hungarian Supreme Court and disciplinary proceeding against the referring judge led him to ask the Court two crucial questions – whether EU law precludes a national court of last instance from declaring as unlawful a decision by which a lower court makes a request for a preliminary ruling, and whether the principle of judicial independence precludes disciplinary proceedings being brought against a judge for having made such a request for a preliminary ruling.

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Note from MEP José Manuel Fernandes regarding European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling

José Manuel Fernandes (Member of the European Parliament)

The principle of the rule of law is not just one among other basic principles of our democracy. It is more than that: it is a sine qua non condition for the recognition of all other fundamental rights. There is no effective freedom of speech, of association, of conscience, among others, in a community that is not governed by law. Where there is no “rule of law”, there is arbitrariness and lack of security. In such conditions, there is no freedom.

When the “rule of law” is abandoned, explicitly or implicitly, we embark on a path that leads from civility to barbarism, from equality before the law, to the rule of the strongest; from the liberal democratic system built and perfected over the last decades, to alternative, authoritarian regimes that restrict freedoms. Whoever foregoes the “rule of law” necessarily foregoes the fundamental principles on which the Portuguese constitutional order and the European Union Treaties are founded (see art. 2 TEU). Therefore, respect for the rule of law is not an option but an obligation in order to be eligible to be a member of the European Union.

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The relevance of judicial institutions in upholding the Rule of Law

Gonçalo Martins de Matos (Master’s student in Judiciary Law at University of Minho) 

Between the 15th and the 16th of February 2022, two landmark decisions were issued by two distinct courts: one regarding EU law, by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and the other regarding Portuguese law, by the Portuguese Constitutional Court. We shall look at both of them and analyse what they introduce (or establish) regarding the defence of the Rule of Law.

We shall start with the CJEU’s decision. On 16 February 2022, the CJEU rendered its judgment in Cases C-156/21 Hungary v. Parliament and Council and C-157/21 Poland v. Parliament and Council. Both Cases emerged from two actions for annulment brought by the Republic of Poland and Hungary concerning Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[1]. This Regulation adopted several provisions linking access to EU funding and the respect for the Rule of Law, with a view to “protect the EU budget from financial risks linked to generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States[2].

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Editorial of March 2021

José Manuel Fernandes, Member of the European Parliament and of the MFF and own resources negotiating team

The EU budget: a legal constellation for the recovery

I. Introduction

The approval of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) is followed by an Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) and a Decision on the EU system of Own Resources (ORD). Because of the pandemic, the Council, after Parliament’s insistence, and with strong support from Angela Merkel and Macron, put forward an historical and solidary decision: the use of a common guarantee based on the EU budget for the Commission to contract a debt of € 750 billion and establish the European Union Recovery Instrument through a Regulation[1] aiming to support the recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis (NGEU). This decision was the only possible solution. Member States did not have the financial means to, for example, increase the EU budget. The decision increases the need for new own resources (sources of revenue). In fact, the NGEU has repercussions on the IIA, the ORD and the MFF 2021/2027 itself: these are all part of a negotiation “package”.

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