Editorial of May 2024

By the Alessandra Silveira (Editor)

“Europe is mortal”: recovering the original impetus for loyal co-operation of Article 4(3) TEU

Last April 25, while the Portuguese were celebrating the 50th anniversary of their democracy, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech at the Sorbonne University urging the European Union (EU) to urgently rethink its economic and defence models, otherwise it will become irrelevant on the world stage value-wise – that is the meaning of the metaphor according to which the Europe we have come to know could die.[1] The rules of the game have changed on several fronts – including geopolitics, economy, trade and culture – and in this context, the “European way of life” is under threat and could fall into decay. Moreover, fighting Western values is the more or less declared plan of those who want a new illiberal international order.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks the beginning of a new phase for European integration, the shape of which is not yet fully understood. But one thing is certain: in this new phase, loyal co-operation between European institutions and Member States – as well as their loyalty to each other – is particularly important. This is not a time for friction or dispute between Europeans and their representatives, because in the face of the barbarity of war, what is at stake is always of an existential nature. In other words, it is always a matter of life and death, also for European values and their relevance in the world. Against this backdrop, it is important to identify the new winds that are blowing across the relations of articulation and interdependence between the legal-constitutional order of the EU and the legal-constitutional order of the Member States.

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Dr. Strangelove or: What Lights Sheds Kubrick on Today’s Union

Gonçalo Martins de Matos (Master in Judiciary Law by the University of Minho) 
           

Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, Stanley Kubrick’s political satire black comedy film, completed, in the past Monday, 60 years of age since its release on 29th January 1964. Often considered one of the best comedies ever made and, arguably, the best political satire of the 20th century[1], the depths of human stupidity are surgically dissected by the keen, sagacious mind of Stanley Kubrick. More than that, Kubrick’s cautionary tale about nuclear apocalypse exposes humans in what they tragicomically have more contradictory, hypocritical and idiosyncratic.

Encompassing a wide spectrum of themes, Dr. Strangelove remains very present, shedding, like all great Art, some light on contemporary issues and events. More so in recent years, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, bringing to the Old Continent the dark fog of war again. Since Russia is a nuclear power, the fear of nuclear escalation invaded once again people’s hearts, reminding the great powers of the Cold War’s Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD – a fittingly ironic name, as well) doctrine. NATO members have been (well) cautious, as to avoid a backslide to the obscurity of the Cold War. Obscurity is the right word to describe the surroundings of war: freedom is suffocated, barricades are erected, and truth is the first victim.

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A specter is haunting Spain — the specter of illiberalism: A young democracy facing its ghosts

Rubén Díez (Professor of Sociology at Complutense University)
           

Populism shows a natural tendency to strain the independence of public functions, the autonomy of civil society and media, as well as the institutional mechanisms regulating the civil sphere in liberal democracies. Obama reminded us of this during the funeral of Republican John McCain in September 2018, implicitly referring to President Trump. A portion of Obama’s eulogy highlighted the rules and principles of rational-legal legitimization that govern our democracies. These include adherence to the duties and responsibilities of public office, as well as the norms regulating voting and the party system. Civil organizations, alongside the political class, must take responsibility for safeguarding these principles to prevent populism from taking root within their ranks and political entities. As Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt remind us in “How Democracies Die”, more essentialist forms of democracy—with demagogic speeches and leaders, populist organizations, plebiscitary practices, and Caesarism—civil institutions see a reduction in their mediating and arbitrating capacity for the multiplicity of material and ideal interests, hindering the expression of civil solidarity. The leader, party, or movement positions itself as the voice of the people, appealing to collective identities exclusively articulated in a binary key of belonging.

Illiberalism in its most extreme forms, especially when it seizes power, thrives by co-opting civil institutions and intermediate spaces. In addition, it silences or sidelines those who articulate alternative positions to its political project. This is achieved by subverting the law and discrediting dissenting voices often through the civil exclusion of discordant voices. If the ultimate expression of this idealized political project successfully materializes in a specific place and time, it opens the door for an anti-democratic populist project to crystallize. Some recent examples include traits of this ideal definition of illiberal scenarios: the leadership of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Law and Justice in Poland, the Brexit referendum in 2016, the declaration of independence in Catalonia in 2017, and the Trump administration in the USA. Sadly, a progressive and accelerated trend of democratic degradation may be observed in Spain as 2023 ends, following the formation of a new coalition government led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) with the support of left-wing populist, nationalist, and separatist forces.

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Summaries of judgments: Asociaţia «Forumul Judecătorilor din România» | Juan

Summaries of judgments made in collaboration with the Portuguese judge and référendaire of the CJEU (Nuno Piçarra and Sophie Perez)

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Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 September 2023, Asociaţia «Forumul Judecătorilor din România», Case C‑216/21, EU:C:2023:628

Reference for a preliminary ruling – Decision 2006/928/EC – Mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption – Article 2 TEU – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Rule of law – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 47 – Independence of judges – National legislation altering the scheme for the promotion of judges

Facts

In 2019, the Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii (Superior Council of Magistracy, Romania) (CSM) altered the procedure for the effective promotion of judges to the regional courts and the courts of appeal by replacing the old written exams with an assessment of candidates’ work and conduct during their last three years of service. The Asociaţia «Forumul Judecătorilor din România» (‘Forum of Judges of Romania’ Association) and YN brought an action before the referring court, the Curtea de Apel Ploiești (Court of Appeal, Ploieşti, Romania), for partial annulment of that decision.

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Editorial of December 2023

By Alessandra Silveira (Editor) 

Is there a threat to the rule of law in the EU as a consequence of the government agreement in Spain and the institutional crisis in Portugal?

The Government agreement in Spain (the amnesty proposal for the Catalan secession process) and the institutional crisis in Portugal (the resignation of the Government due to signs of influence peddling) have an impact on the functioning of the European Union (EU) because they could jeopardise the value of the rule of law on which the Union is founded (Article 2 TEU).

What is the meaning of the principle (i.e. the legal norm) of the rule of law in the EU? It means that the exercise of power is subject to legal rules and procedures (i.e. legislative, executive, and judicial procedures) that allow citizens to monitor (and possibly challenge) the legitimacy of decisions taken by public authorities. The basic idea of the rule of law is therefore to submit power to the law. This fundamental norm conditions the accession of a candidate State to the EU – and authorises the Union to monitor the proper functioning of the rule of law in the various Member States.

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Editorial of June 2023

By Joana Covelo de Abreu (Editor and Key-staff member of CitDig Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence) 

2023 EU Justice Scoreboard – how independent and efficient justice systems can strengthen the business dimension in the EU through digitalisation?

The current European Semester is devoted to sustainable economic growth, within the EU’s annual cycle of economic policy coordination. Insofar, in the 2023 annual sustainable growth survey [COM(2022) 780 final], the European Commission stressed that “[g]ood governance and respect for the rule of law, in particular independent, quality and efficient justice systems […], are key determinants of an economy that works for people” – in fact, there is a “link between effective justice systems and Member States’ business environment” since “[w]ell-functioning and fully independent justice systems can have a positive impact on investment and are key for investment protection, and therefore contribute to productivity and competitiveness”.

Published last June 8th, 2023, the EU Justice Scoreboard [COM(2023) 309 final] acts as a comparative tool to assist the EU and its Member States to understand the justice systems’ state so it can be improved “by providing objective, reliable and comparable data on a number of indicators relevant for the assessment of the efficacy, quality and independence of justice systems in all Member States”.

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On the triggering of the EU’s conditionality mechanism: what has been done and what could follow

Gonçalo Martins de Matos (Master in Judiciary Law by the University of Minho)
 

            When the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered, at the beginning of the last year, the two landmark judgements Hungary v. Parliament and Council (Case C-156/21) and Poland v. Parliament and Council (Case C-157/21), the conditionality mechanism created by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 for the protection of the Union’s budget[1] definitely gained the green light for its implementation, in the sequence of which the Commission adopted the guidelines of application of said mechanism. On 27 April of the same year, the European Commission formally announced it would be triggering the conditionality mechanism against Hungary. After an intense period of negotiations between Brussels and Budapest, the European Commission adopted, on 18 September, a proposal on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary[2] (COM(2022) 485 final), following which the Council of the EU adopted, on 18 September, an implementing decision on the measures proposed by the Commission.

            Before we proceed with the analysis of the proposed measures and their impacts on the protection of the rule of law, we must briefly provide the necessary legal framework. As we have discussed before, the intention behind the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 is “the protection of the Union budget in the case of breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the Member States”, as is set out in Article 1 of the same Regulation. Article 3 of this Regulation establishes situations that may indicate a breach of the principles of the rule of law, and Article 4 stipulates the conditions for the adoption of the necessary measures to protect the same principles. Article 5 lays down the measures that can be adopted in case the Commission finds that the principles of the rule of law have been breached under the described terms, following the procedure set out in Article 6 of the Regulation. We further add that Article 5(3) enshrines a principle of proportionality when adopting those protective measures. Article 6(1) determines that the Commission may resort to the conditionality mechanism unless it considers that other procedures set out in Union legislation would allow it to protect the Union budget more effectively. Seeing that the European Commission has already resorted to Article 7 TEU and to several infringement procedures regarding the Hungarian government’s various breaches, the conditions were met to activate the conditionality regime.

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The system of investigation of offences committed by judges and prosecutors in Romania, once again under the attention of the CJEU

Dragoș Călin (Judge at the Bucharest Court of Appeal and Co-President of the Romanian Judges' Forum Association) 

By the decision issued on 24 November 2022, the Pitești Court of Appeal referred two preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, the second of which concerns the compatibility of the new system of investigation of offences committed by judges and prosecutors, as a result of the dismantling of the famous Special Section (SIOJ), criticized by all relevant international bodies and regarding which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) itself expressed serious doubts related to the compatibility with the European Union law.

Thus, by the judgment issued in the joined cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19, Asociația Forumul Judecătorilor din România and Others, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union established that Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the TEU, as well as the Commission Decision 2006/928 of 13 December 2006 establishing a Mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption (CVM) must be interpreted as precluding national regulation that provides for the establishment in the Public Ministry of a specialized section that has exclusive competence to investigate the offences committed by judges and prosecutors without the establishment of such section being justified by objective and verifiable requirements related to the sound administration of justice and without being accompanied by specific guarantees that allow, on the one hand, to remove any risk that this section may be used as an instrument of political control over the activity of those judges and prosecutors likely to affect their independence and, on the other hand, to ensure that such competence can be used in relation to the latter in full compliance with the requirements resulting from Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

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The role of associations of judges in defending the rule of law: legitimacy of unconditional locus standi in situations where they seek to obtain effective jurisdictional protection in areas regulated by European Union law

Dragoș Călin [Judge at the Bucharest Court of Appeal, Co-President of the Romanian Judges' Forum Association, Director of the Judges' Forum Review (Revista Forumul Judecătorilor)]. 

On 24 November 2022, the Pitești Court of Appeal referred two preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, the first of which concerns the legitimacy of locus standi and the procedural interest of professional associations of judges in order to promote and defend the independence of judges and the rule of law, as well as to safeguard the status of the profession, in situations where associations seek to obtain effective jurisdictional protection in areas regulated by Union law.

The litigation initiated by the Romanian Judges’ Forum Association respectively by the Movement for Defending the Status of Prosecutors Association, two of the most important associations of Romanian judges and prosecutors, seeks the annulment of administrative acts regarding the appointment within the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice of prosecutors who will conduct criminal investigations in corruption cases regarding judges and prosecutors, given that, in Romania, the competence of the National Anticorruption Directorate in this field has been completely removed.

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Lula da Silva is President of Brazil once again: are we closing a cycle of lawfare?

By Guilherme Torrentes (Master in Human Rights from the University of Minho)

On January 1, 2023, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn in as President of Brazil for the third time, after one of the fiercest electoral disputes since the re-democratization of the country (which occurred in 1985), in which Lula da Silva defeated Jair Bolsonaro. It is perhaps the end of a cycle of “lawfare” – a term that can be defined as the strategic use of law for the purpose of delegitimizing, harming, or annihilating an enemy[1] – that is, the perverse use of legal rules and procedures for the purpose of political persecution. This cycle of lawfare was initiated in a tentative way by what became known as “Mensalão” (a “mega” or “maxi” judicial process that culminated in the conviction of several political members of Lula’s first government for corruption) and worsened with the impeachment process of President Dilma Roussef and “Operação Lava Jato” (another “mega” judicial process that culminated in the illegal imprisonment of Lula for 580 days).

This cycle of lawfare has jeopardized the continuity of the democratic rule of law, as the Brazilian judiciary and criminal process have been instrumentalized by the exception and subjectivity undesirable to its performance, in order to achieve the desired political ends. It is worth noting that in 2018, the Brazilian State failed to comply with a recommendation of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee to guarantee Lula the right to run for the presidential elections of that year, invoking its domestic laws to not apply Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which guarantees every citizen the right and the opportunity, without unreasonable restrictions, to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors).[2]

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