Brexit and the possibility of “withdrawing the withdrawal”: a hypothetical question?

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 by Alessandra Silveira, Editor

In case C-621/18, Wightman and others, pending judgment by the ECJ, the request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 50 TEU. It has been made in proceedings where the opposing Scots parties are Andy Wightman and o., on the one hand, and the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, on the other, raising the question whether it is possible to revoke the notification of the intention of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to withdraw from the European Union. The Court of Session, Inner House, First Division (Scotland), seeks, in essence, to ascertain whether, where a Member State has notified the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with Article 50 TEU, EU law permits that Member State to unilaterally revoke its notification before the end of the period of two years referred to in that Article. If so, the referring court is uncertain as to the conditions governing such a revocation and its effects relative to that Member State remaining within the European Union.

The referring court states that, under Section 13 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the withdrawal agreement which might be concluded between the United Kingdom and the Union under Article 50(2) TEU, setting out the arrangements for that withdrawal, may be ratified only if that agreement and the framework for the future relationship of the United Kingdom and the European Union has been approved by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The referring court states that, where the withdrawal agreement is not approved by that Parliament, and if no other proposal is made, the departure of the United Kingdom from the Union will nonetheless take effect as from 29 March 2019. The referring court adds that it is uncertain whether it is possible to revoke the notification unilaterally and to remain within the European Union. That court also states that an answer from the ECJ will clarify the options open to the parliamentarians when they vote on those matters.
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Poland and the Crisis of Rule of Law: “Alea Jacta Est?”

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 by José Igreja Matos, President of the European Association of Judges

October 19th 2018. The Vice-President of the Court of Justice ordered the Republic of Poland to immediately suspend provisions of the recent Polish law on the Supreme Court that lowered the retirement age for Supreme Court judges to 65 years, which would have the effect of removing nearly one-third of the Court’s judges.

One month has passed. Nothing happened.

Quite the opposite, in fact: on 9th November 2018 the new Polish National Council of Judiciary issued a resolution that concretely blocks the interim measure of October 19th. To be more precise, the resolution contains a threat of disciplinary responsibility for the reinstated Supreme Court Judges, if they perform official duties. Obviously this resolution may have a considerable negative impact on the way the order of the Vice-President of the CJEU is being carried out.

In this context, it must be underlined that, on 17th September 2018, the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), after considering that an essential condition of ENCJ membership is “that institutions are independent of the executive and legislature and ensure the final responsibility for the support of the judiciary in the independent delivery of justice” decided to suspend the membership of the Polish National Judicial Council, the KRS, in the ENCJ.
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The US CLOUD Act and EU Law

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 by Alexandre Veronese, Professor at University of Brasília

In March 2018, the President of the United States of America signed into Law a Bill approved by the Congress, which amended two parts of the US Code, the consolidation of the federal statutory norms of the country. The Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act – CLOUD Act – was the third version of two preceding bills. Those prior bills tried to solve a grave contemporary issue: the difficulty to access electronic data that could be necessary to criminal investigations and prosecution. The new CLOUD Act changes mainly two passages of the US Code. It creates the possibility that the United States and foreign countries could sign executive agreements to grant mutual assistance in order to authorize the gathering of overseas data. In addition, the CLOUD Act creates standards to those agreements.

The United States of America have a long standing right to due process of law entrenched in the Fourth Amendment of its Constitution. The debate about the limits to access information captured by the means of new ways of communication is rather old in the US. The Federal Wiretap Act came to the US Code amidst the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. It was a huge alteration of the Title 18 of US Code, which is the Crimes and Criminal Procedures federal statutory law. Therefore, the federal statutory law received provisions that could regulate the lawful wiretapping in criminal investigations and the use of them between agencies and jurisdictions. Notwithstanding, the passing of time and the evolution of technologies showed the aging of those legal norms. A lot of the information that matters to seize, in order to archive effective evidence to use in investigations, came to be electronic. It was necessary to modify the Wiretap Act and, in 1986, it came the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The new Act modernized the Law and it regulated the criminal features related to stored electronic information – the Stored Communications Act. The Patriot Act (2001 and 2006) brought to light some provisions regarding to overseas information that were made more detailed with the amendments signed into law in 2008.
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Editorial of November 2018

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 by Alessandra Silveira, Editor


In the face of globalised populism, European Union as a kind of “life insurance”

In case C-619/18, Commission v Poland, pending judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), the European Commission has requested the Court, in the context of interim proceedings, to order Poland to suspend the application of the provisions of national legislation relating to the lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges,[i] among other measures.

As the ECJ Press Release No 159/18 briefly explains, on 3 April 2018 the new Polish Law on the Supreme Court entered into force. Under that Law, the retirement age for Supreme Court judges has been lowered to 65. The new age limit applies as of the date of entry into force of that Law. It is possible for Supreme Court judges to continue in active judicial service beyond the age of 65 but this is subject to the submission of a statement indicating the desire of the judge concerned to continue to perform his/her duties and a certificate stating that his/her health conditions allow him/her to serve, and must be consented to by the President of the Republic of Poland. Thus, according to the Law, serving Supreme Court judges who reached the age of 65 before that Law entered into force or, at the latest, on 3 July 2018, were required to retire on 4 July 2018, unless they had submitted such a statement and such a certificate by 3 May 2018 inclusive and the President of the Republic of Poland had granted them permission to continue in active service at the Supreme Court. In making his decision, the President of the Republic of Poland is not bound by any criteria and that decision is not subject to any form of judicial review. Furthermore, the Law on the Supreme Court gives the President of the Republic of Poland the power to freely decide, until 3 April 2019, to increase the number of Supreme Court judges.

As we know, the Vice-President of the Court, Ms Rosario de Lapuerta, on 19 October 2018, provisionally granted all the Commission’s requests – and Poland must immediately suspend the application of the new Polish Law on the Supreme Court.[ii] The legal basis of such ruling, relying upon judicial independence as a general principle of EU law and as a fundamental right protected in its order, has been built in the recent ECJ case-law, especially in judgments Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP) and LM[iii].
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LM judgment – effective judicial protection as general principle and fundamental right

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 by Joana Covelo de Abreu, Editor

2018 is the year when effective judicial protection undertakes several new developments.

In this sense, the Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses’ judgment (ASJP) set the tone to great developments under effective judicial protection dimension concerning the independence of courts. In this decision, the Court of Justice understood effective judicial protection as not only a fundamental right, but also a general principle of EU law. In fact, the Court of Justice preferred to set this jurisprudence based on the general principle – as enshrined Article 19 (1) (2) TFEU – because that was the way to liberate effective judicial protection from the methodical difficulties brought by Article 51 CFREU.

In this decision, the Court of Justice reasoned based on Article 2 TEU (concerning the values of the EU), Article 4 (3) TEU (principle of sincere cooperation) and Article 19 (1) TEU, emphasising Article 19 (1) TEU as a “concrete expression to the value of the rule of law stated in Article 2 TEU” and acknowledging the integrated nature of the EU judiciary system – composed both by ECJ as EU organic court and national courts as EU functioning courts.

But when we thought the Court of Justice had already enough developed effective judicial protection, we are surprised with the LM judgment (case C-216/18 PPU).

This decision, issued on the July 25th 2018, was developed under a preliminary reference made in order to interpret the limits concerning the enforcement of three European Arrest Warrants. They aimed at arresting and surrendering LM to Polish authorities for the purpose of conducting criminal prosecutions (concerning trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances).
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