The “mandatory” contact-tracing App “StayAway COVID” – a matter of European Union Law

by Alessandra Silveira, Joana Covelo de Abreu (Editors) and Tiago Sérgio Cabral (Managing Editor)

1. During the previous week there as been plenty of controversy regarding a proposal by the Portuguese Government to make the installation of the App “StayAway COVID” (“App”) – a mobile contact-tracing application designed to fight the pandemic – mandatory for large sections of the population. While the Government appears to have backed down from this idea (for now) the issue of European Union Law (“EU Law”) has been surprisingly absent from most of the debate around a measure of this nature, even though it should be front and centre and precedes even the issue of constitutionality.

As we will show in this text, it is difficult to argue against the conclusion that this subject should be considered as a matter of EU Law – and, consequently, that this is a question of fundamental rights protected by the European Union (“EU”). In the EU’s legal framework, privacy and personal data protection are fundamental rights enshrined within Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU). Since it is a matter regulated at EU level, the EU’s standard of fundamental rights’ protection is applicable before and above even the national constitutional standards of protection[i]. So, this is not just a Portuguese constitutional problem that can be solved in the light of the Portuguese Constitution – it is an issue of relevance to all European citizens which needs to be resolved in the light of the EU´s (jus)fundamental standards (see Article 51 CFREU).[ii] It is important to be aware that the Court of Justice of the EU (“ECJ”), in the past, struck down constitutional provisions from Member States to ensure the adequate protection of fundamental rights of privacy and personal data protection[iii]. This is because all Member States do not have the same level of (jus)fundamental protection.

2. Under the current legal framework in the EU, enforcing the use of any contact-tracing application to the general public (or to large sections of the general public such as the entire population inserted within the labour market, academia, schools and public administration) would always face some serious challenges.

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The fundamental right to life in the case Soares Campos v. Portugal: where do we stand?

by Mariana Alvim, PhD candidate and member of CIDP

Brief description of the Case

The present case[i] concerned the death of Mr. Soares Campos’s son who was swept out to sea while taking part in a gathering related to Praxe[ii] in a beach in Portugal.

Mr. Soares Campos (hereafter “applicant” or “claimant”) lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter “Court” or “ECtHR”) on the 27 May 2016.

The applicant based his complain on the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter “ECHR” or “Convention”), sustaining that there was not an effective investigation capable of establishing the circumstances of his son’s death.

The claimant also grounded his complain in a substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention, declaring that his son’s death had been caused by the lack of a legal framework regulating Praxe activities in the Portuguese Universities.
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Editorial of October 2018

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 by Vlad Jurje, PhD candidate and Lecturer at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos


Poland v. Fundamental Rights?

A new episode concerning to the Rule of Law in Poland has recently taken place and the European Commission is very concerned. After the recent reform of the National Council of the Judiciary[i], the Polish Parliament has the capacity to decide when to appoint the member judges that compose it. A fact that seriously undermines the norms and international standards on which the independence of the judicial power in Europe is regulated.

We also highlight the instability that has arisen from the reform of the Constitutional Court in Poland because the interference that the Executive and the Legislative branches have committed put at risk the independence of the judicial power. According to the new law which has come into force, out of the 72 current members that form part of the Supreme Court 27 could be forced to retire, since the retirement age was changed: instead of retiring at 70, the new law would remove men at 65 and women at 60.
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Taricco continues – between constitutional national identity and highest level of protection of fundamental rights, where does effectiveness of EU law stand?

Stone Tower Layered Cairn Stones Stacked Balance

 by Alessandra Silveira, Editor 
 and Sophie Perez Fernandes, Junior Editor

In September 2015, and in the wake of the case-law set in Fransson, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) detailed in Taricco the scope of the Member States’ obligations to combat VAT fraud (see comment here). The ECJ is now faced with the repercussions of said judgment as the Corte costituzionale [the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)] questions the compatibility of the solution established therein with supreme principles of the Italian constitutional order.

As is well known, the Taricco case called into question the Italian regime on limitation periods for criminal offenses. The national provisions in question were such that, given the complexity and duration of criminal proceedings, defendants accused of VAT evasion constituting serious fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests were likely to enjoy de facto impunity as a result of the expiration of the limitation period. Having established that the Italian regime in question was not in conformity with EU law, the ECJ interpreted Article 325 TFEU as having “the effect, in accordance with the principle of the precedence of EU law, in their relationship with the domestic law of the Member States, of rendering automatically inapplicable, merely by their entering into force, any conflicting provision of national law”. Therefore, national courts were to “ensure that EU law is given full effect, if need be by disapplying those provisions (…), without having to request or await the prior repeal of those articles by way of legislation or any other constitutional procedure”. The ECJ significantly added that, if a national court decides to disapply the national provisions at issue, “it must also ensure that the fundamental rights of the persons concerned are respected” as penalties might be applied to them, which, in all likelihood, would not have been imposed under those national provisions. In this regard, the ECJ did not consider that such a disapplication of national law would infringe the rights of the accused as guaranteed by Article 49 CFREU on the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties.

The Taricco judgment caused some stir within the Italian legal community. A few days after the delivery of the judgment, the Corte d’appello di Milano (Court of Appeal of Milan), instead of applying the solution formulated therein in a case pending before it concerning serious fraud in relation to VAT, stayed the proceedings to raise a question of constitutionality before the ICC, which would be followed months later by the Corte suprema di cassazione (Court of Cassation). Both courts have doubts as to the compatibility of the case-law established in Taricco with supreme principles of the Italian constitutional order and with the requirement to respect inalienable human rights as laid down by the Italian Constitution, with particular reference to the principle of legality in criminal matters [Article 25(2) of the Italian Constitution]. Hearing such concerns, the ICC sought a preliminary reference from the ECJ (here and here) according to an expedited procedure, the application of which was deferred (here). Advocate-General Yves Bot recently rendered its Opinion (here).

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Editorial of October 2016

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by Sophie Perez Fernandes, Junior Editor

Engaging EU liability within the European Stability Mechanism framework

Last September 20th, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered two judgments regarding the role of the European Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Central Bank, in the negotiation and signing of the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) during the 2012-2013 financial crisis, and, in particular, in the restructuring of the banking sector in Cyprus imposed as a condition for the grant of financial assistance.

In Mallis and Malli (Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P), actions were brought against the European Commission and the European Central Bank for the annulment of the Eurogroup’s statement of 25 March 2013 concerning, inter alia, the restructuring of the banking sector in Cyprus. In turn, in Ledra Advertising (Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P), depositors of two large Cypriot banks brought actions against the European Commission and the European Central Bank for the partial annulment of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 adopted jointly by the ESM and the Republic of Cyprus and also for compensation for damages allegedly suffered following the request for financial assistance and the ensuing restructuring of the two banks in question.

The ECJ had already been called upon to rule on judicial protection questions raised by the ESM framework. Created in order to provide, where needed, financial assistance to the Member States whose currency is the euro, the ESM was instituted through an international agreement between euro area Member States – the Treaty establishing the ESM, concluded in Brussels the 2th February 2012, in force since the 27th September 2012. Thus, the ESM Treaty is not part of the EU legal order, as confirmed by the ECJ in the famous Pringle judgment (C-370/12). As a consequence, when creating the ESM, or acting within its framework, Member States do not act within the scope of application of EU law for the purposes, in particular, of Article 51(1) CFREU. Individuals seeking to challenge Member States’ measures adopted pursuant the conditions laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding would not, therefore, find in the preliminary ruling mechanism an indirect means of access to the ECJ in order to assess their compliance with EU law and, in particular, the CFREU as the former was not in question and the latter was hence out of reach.

What the above mentioned judgments, and especially Ledra Advertising, emphasize is the link nonetheless existing between the ESM framework and the EU legal order. Quoting Alicia Hinarejos (EU Law Analysis), in order to carry out its functions, the ESM “borrows” two EU institutions, the European Commission and the European Central Bank, two thirds of the infamously known Troika. The question is whether (and, if so, when) EU institutions’ actions within the ESM framework might be reviewed and, when harmful, give rise to compensation under EU law and, in particular, in light of the CFREU.

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Social citizenship: quo vadis? – Inaugural Editorial

by Alessandra Silveira, Editor
and Sophie Perez Fernandes, Junior Editor

The European citizenship as the “the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”[1] has been shaping the process of integration itself. Unquestionably linked to the protection of fundamental rights, European citizenship has always been focused on the approximation of the legal status of the nationals of Member States, providing the legal base to the eradication of legal gaps of protection and, therefore, contributing to the further development of the integration process. However, recent case law of the ECJ seems to be influenced by the current political-economic dynamics that characterise the current crucial momentum that we are facing, raising perplexity and concern when compared to past rulings which compose the jurisprudential acquis in matters of citizenship and fundamental rights – mainly in what concerns citizens that move in the Union seeking jobs and the maintenance of the status of migrant worker.

The Dano ruling of 2014[2] represents a setback in regard to the previous case law of the ECJ regarding the granting of special non-contributory cash benefits to citizens who are not economically active. Despite the fact that, in this concrete case, a residence certificate of unlimited duration was previously granted to the applicant – a fact apparently disregard by this ruling – the national court considered that the main proceedings concerned persons who could not claim a right of residence in the host State by virtue of Directive 2004/38/CE. The ECJ accompanied the reasoning of the national court stating that the access to social benefits is dependent on the residence in the host Member State as set out by Article 7 of the mentioned Directive – i.e. sufficient economic resources and health insurance[3]. The goal would be to prevent economically inactive citizens from becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State[4], or from using the host Member State’s welfare system to fund their means of subsistence[5]. Admitting otherwise, according to the Court, would go against the objectives of the Directive[6].

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