Rubén Díez (Professor of Sociology at Complutense University)

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Populism shows a natural tendency to strain the independence of public functions, the autonomy of civil society and media, as well as the institutional mechanisms regulating the civil sphere in liberal democracies. Obama reminded us of this during the funeral of Republican John McCain in September 2018, implicitly referring to President Trump. A portion of Obama’s eulogy highlighted the rules and principles of rational-legal legitimization that govern our democracies. These include adherence to the duties and responsibilities of public office, as well as the norms regulating voting and the party system. Civil organizations, alongside the political class, must take responsibility for safeguarding these principles to prevent populism from taking root within their ranks and political entities. As Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt remind us in “How Democracies Die”, more essentialist forms of democracy—with demagogic speeches and leaders, populist organizations, plebiscitary practices, and Caesarism—civil institutions see a reduction in their mediating and arbitrating capacity for the multiplicity of material and ideal interests, hindering the expression of civil solidarity. The leader, party, or movement positions itself as the voice of the people, appealing to collective identities exclusively articulated in a binary key of belonging.

Illiberalism in its most extreme forms, especially when it seizes power, thrives by co-opting civil institutions and intermediate spaces. In addition, it silences or sidelines those who articulate alternative positions to its political project. This is achieved by subverting the law and discrediting dissenting voices often through the civil exclusion of discordant voices. If the ultimate expression of this idealized political project successfully materializes in a specific place and time, it opens the door for an anti-democratic populist project to crystallize. Some recent examples include traits of this ideal definition of illiberal scenarios: the leadership of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Law and Justice in Poland, the Brexit referendum in 2016, the declaration of independence in Catalonia in 2017, and the Trump administration in the USA. Sadly, a progressive and accelerated trend of democratic degradation may be observed in Spain as 2023 ends, following the formation of a new coalition government led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) with the support of left-wing populist, nationalist, and separatist forces.

1. The 2023 election

On July 23, 2023, Spaniards went to the polls and the results revealed the definitive configuration of two blocs around the two major political parties. The constitutionalist bloc, led by the People’s Party (PP) with 137 seats, and on the other hand, a de facto confederal or plurinational model led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) with 121 seats. To form a stable government each party depended on nationalist and/or separatist organizations, as well as populist forces, either on the left or the right political spectrum. In the constitutionalist bloc, the PP was in a clear position of subservience to the populist radical right, VOX, with 33 seats, causing division and/or distancing potential support from their social base of voters. Moreover, it mobilizes opposition potential followers, partly accounting for their electoral results in the 2023 general elections falling below expectations. The rise of VOX in recent years has represented the most radical and essentialist drift of constitutionalism in response to separatism and the Catalan process in 2017. On a global or international scale, it represents the partisan synopsis of the cultural backlash against identity politics stemming from alternative and social justice movements, which many now refer to as “woke,” inspiring numerous policies in different locations and countries.

On the other hand, in the confederal bloc, we find the PSOE in a strategic coalition with Sumar, 31 seats, an alliance of leftist parties aimed to embody the agenda of alternative social movements in the institutional arena. Their leaders are comprised of activists, former activists, representatives of civil society, academics, and intellectuals. Their existence can only be understood because of the developments within the mobilization of the 15-M movement in 2011, in addition to the different actors that took the lead in that broad framework of collective action and subsequent institutional formalization. The emotional connection of the epistemological leaders of this party-movement organization with the idea of the common (the commune), and the experience of social and political movements for social justice, along with the Latin American populist mystique, with its plurinational agenda, is crucial in understanding their alliance and empathy with regionalists, nationalists, and independence supporters, forming the third pole of the confederal bloc.

This scenario reflects the progressive degradation of democratic institutions that has taken place in Spain in the last decades. Since the two main parties have carried out illiberal practices to a surprising extent and to varying degrees and forms in recent times, to either mobilize their social bases or control the levers of the State and maintain their positions. Among the most serious instances are the partisan handling of institutions, not to mention a low-intensity or discursive populism embodied in slogans or phrases during electoral campaigns. Nevertheless, the peak of this illiberal shift reached a peak in 2017 when a national populist movement in Catalonia, led by its regional authorities, unleashed a contentious political process that culminated in a declaration of independence, and its leaders were subsequently convicted on charges of sedition. This situation deteriorated significantly since then and after the last general elections.

Although the confederal bloc faced a decline in political power from 191 to 171 seats, the leader of the socialist party, Pedro Sánchez, achieved enough seats to turn into the presidency. However, to sustain his government, the illiberal and uncivil forms of governance have only grown exponentially. He is paying a high price given that he and the governance of the country depend on Sumar, the Basque, and Catalan nationalists and independentist forces, and especially from the former President of Catalonia, Carles Puigdemnt, a fugitive from Spanish justice, and his parliamentary group. The demands of this group in exchange for keeping Sánchez in power are a threat to social harmony in Spain since include an unconstitutional amnesty to the leaders of the 2017 coup against constitutional democracy, as the president himself acknowledged until days before the elections, the establishment of parliamentary and extrajudicial commissions to review judicial proceedings under accusations of lawfare, or the acceptance of an international mediator with whom both will hold closed-door meetings, away from public scrutiny, in a third European country.

2. An illiberal strategy

To keep all this governmental political strategy the government is displaying a lack of respect for the tacit rules of behavior and courtesy inherent in the chambers of representation of liberal democracy. This was exemplified by President Sánchez in his recent appearance in the European Parliament and his heated debate with the leader of the European People’s Party Group, the German Manfred Weber, during which the Spanish President lied in his statements and asked whether Weber’s plan for Germany also involved reinstating the nomenclature of the Third Reich for the streets, and leaving the parliament during the german’s reply turn. On the other hand, a clear process of co-optation of key civil institutions is being developed: the appointment of officials aligned with the Government in the Presidency of the Congress, the Supreme Court or the State Prosecutor’s Office, the partisan appropriation of the leading news agency in Spanish, EFE, or the public opinion main institution for the country, the Center for Sociological Research. In numerous instances within civil society, utilizing mobilization and institutional channels, including organizations from civil society, journalists, and some academics, and judge associations with diverse ideological sensitivities, are raising their voices against these measures. They are drawing attention to European institutions regarding the illiberal threat that Sánchez’s government already poses to the rule of law in Spain and, consequently, to democracy.

To conclude, I would like to highlight a recent analysis prepared by three civic associations, Foro de Profesores, Impulso Ciudadano, and Citizens pro-Europe, who have issued a report on “The Deterioration of the Rule of Law in Spain“, calling to determine actions, as the current illiberal drift may become challenging to reverse in Spain. The report has been sent to European institutions, and these associations, in line with judge associations and constitutional law experts, such as Hay Derecho. They claim that the approval of an amnesty law in favor of individuals who attempted to achieve the secession of Catalonia will further deepen the deterioration of the rule of law. They call attention to the deterioration of the rule of law in civil institutions, which manifests as threats to judicial independence, and tolerance toward certain crimes, including embezzlement, with the aggravating factor that this tolerance operates based on the criminals’ affiliation with government parties. It also emphasizes the partisan use of institutions and the lack of independence in public media. These attacks on the functioning rules of liberal democracy are interconnected and tied to a political discourse that, while not inherently contrary to the rule of law, plays a legitimizing role in democratic liberal practices.

It would be worthwhile to remember the birth of the European Union, not to mention that even the Modern Social Welfare State based on the Rule of Law stemmed from agreements among liberals, conservatives, and social democrats. What prevents Pedro Sánchez, in his current illiberal path, from reaching agreements with Spanish liberals and conservatives? We are repeating the serious mistakes of the past. Meanwhile, in just 18 years, the country has lost 13 points of relative wealth compared to the rest of the EU countries. Our per capita GDP has fallen to 85%. The political system seems indifferent to this, constantly entangled in party interests and the latest controversy, fueling polarization, social divisiveness, and confrontation. Let’s keep in mind and not forget that the Spanish Civil War is considered the ugly prelude to World War II.

Picture credits: Pixabay on Pexels.com.