Mariana Cunha Marques (Masters in European Union Law from the School of Law of University of Minho)

The new horizons of consumer credit legislation

Consumer credit is a fundamental instrument, but despite its indispensability, it continues to pose significant risks, especially when granted irresponsibly. This phenomenon has driven up levels of indebtedness and over-indebtedness within the European Union. The new Consumer Credit Directive – Directive 2225/2023 – introduced important innovations, considering its main objective of strengthening consumer protection.

Firstly, we must mention the extension of the scope of application in Article 2, which was vital in order to regulate and adapt to the digital economy and new credit products on the market. Of particular note is Article 2(2)(c), which delimits the application of the Directive, stipulating that its provisions do not apply to credit agreements with a total amount exceeding €100,000. The abolition of the minimum limit allowed its provisions to cover certain types of credit that required stricter regulation, such as high-cost credits or payday/instant loans[1] and “buy now, pay later” solutions.[2] These products can be considered harmful to consumers because they are granted quickly,[3] ignoring the need to assess creditworthiness. Furthermore, they have very high costs, and, in the event of default, the additional costs are exorbitant.[4]

Bruno Miguel Saraiva (Masters in European Union Law from the School of Law of the University of Minho)

Though the idea that the transformative effects of high technology are sudden and self-imposing is tempting, this truism collapses when confronted with reality. The digital and internet revolutions may have unfolded within a single human lifetime, yet they were fundamentally transgenerational efforts shaped by people with diverse educations and upbringings.

Arriving at the technological landscape we inhabit today required the combined expertise, unique skills, capabilities and opportunities of individuals with remarkably different backgrounds. The major technological shifts of the 19^th and 20^th century enabled – and accelerated – further technological development through cross-disciplinary exchange.

This is especially visible in the evolution of programming languages. From Assembly to Elixir, new languages emerge regularly. As they rise in popularity, older ones fade as the pool of proficient users shrinks. This cycle is natural, but not without consequences. Legacy systems underpin everything from warehouses to critical infrastructure. Many rely on “outdated” but highly effective languages that excel at specific tasks – languages shaped during moments of generational transition, when the practices of analog-era experts were translated into digital workflows, data processing, and automation.

Teresa Freixes (President of Citizens pro Europe and Jean Monnet Professor ad personam)

[1]

Liters of ink would flow, were it not for computers, regarding the controversial Opinion of the Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the preliminary questions submitted to this Court by the Audiencia Nacional[2] and the Tribunal de Cuentas[3] on certain aspects of the Spanish Organic Law on Amnesty (OLA).[4]

Two mandatory, but not binding, opinions were issued as required by the proceedings before the CJEU, serving as a preparatory draft for the judgment that the Court will eventually deliver. This is not the only “guidance” available to the CJEU, as the European Commission also expressed the opinion of the EU executive branch on the matter, and the parties that raised the questions, as well as those who initiated them, were able to submit their arguments and observations. Furthermore, there was a debate during the oral hearing held in the Grand Chamber (15 judges), with the participation of the State Attorney and the Public Prosecutor before the Tribunal de Cuentas. We mention this because, given the media frenzy, it seems as though the Advocate General’s Opinion has been interpreted as an oracle destined to guide our lives, and especially those of people involved in the application of the OLA. Nothing could be further from the truth, as the CJEU has this entire body of legal evidence to support its deliberations and judgment.

Juan Gálvez Galisteo (PhD Candidate, University of Seville)

1. The context: election system of the governing body of judges in Spain and the request for an Opinion from the Venice Commission

On 13 October 2025, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (known as the Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe made public its Advisory Opinion No. 1248/2025, adopted at its 144^th Plenary Session, in which it responds to the request submitted by the General Council of the Judiciary – the governing body of judges in Spain – concerning the reform proposals included in its February report and their possible alignment with European standards on judicial independence. The request was submitted with the intention of determining whether the proposed reforms could be adjusted to the European standards that institutions of the European Union and the Council of Europe – such as the Venice Commission – have been establishing through their soft-law instruments in recent years.

Advisory Opinion No. 1248/2025 was adopted on 9 and 10 October, approximately one month after the rapporteurs visited Spain and met with authorities and stakeholders involved in the General Council of the Judiciary and its renewal process. To properly contextualise and understand the Commission’s document, it is necessary to briefly outline its most recent background. In the summer of 2024, the governing body of judges in Spain was finally renewed after nearly six years of an unprecedented deadlock, given that this constitutional institution – which must be renewed every five years – had remained in an interim situation since 2018, when its renewal should have taken place.

João Pedro Sousa (master’s student in European Union Law at the School of Law of the University of Minho) 

I.

The digital transformation has reconfigured the foundations of modern society, multiplying channels of communication, accelerating economic innovation, and redefining the exercise of citizenship.  However, the same technological developments that sustain progress have also created new vulnerabilities, giving rise to a new domain of criminality: cybercrime.  Within the European Union (EU), the protection of the digital sphere has thus become a constitutional concern, lying at the intersection of security policy, protection of fundamental rights, and market regulation.[1][2]

The concept of digital citizenship within the EU captures the recognition and protection of citizens’ rights and obligations in cyberspace, including privacy, freedom of speech and safe access to digital technologies.[3]  Cybercrime threatens these rights, ranging from data breaches to large-scale attacks on critical infrastructure, undermining citizen’s confidence in the Union’s capacity to ensure safety and accountability online.[4]  In this context, the 2024 Report on the State of Cybersecurity in the Union by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)[5][6][7] exposes a worrying rise in cyber incidents,[8] particularly ransomware, phishing, and artificial-intelligence-related crimes, accentuating the urgent need for coordinated legislative and operational responses at the Union level.[9]

Bruno Saraiva [master’s student in European Union Law and Digital Citizenship & Technological Sustainability (CitDig) scholarship holder])

Why the EU’s approach to AI development differs from that of the U.S. or China is a question that spans philosophy, sociology, geopolitics, and economics. But the simplest answer may be the following: they are different. Each polity carries distinct priorities, institutions, and constraints – and these differences translate into divergent AI trajectories.

In Europe, this divergence goes beyond regulation and economics; it extends to the very technical models being developed. While the U.S. and China pursue scale through ever-larger general-purpose systems, the EU has signaled a regulatory preference for limited models – special-purpose systems trained with curated data.

This post explores the methodological virtues of that approach. In a world where large models struggle with trust, reliability, and compliance with rights-based law, the EU’s strategy offers an alternative: models designed to minimise hallucinations, resist “model collapse”, and reduce opacity. By embedding rigor into training practices, the EU may not only advance trustworthy AI but also begin addressing its competitiveness woes, as underscored by the Draghi Report.[1]