João Pedro Sousa (master’s student in European Union Law at the School of Law of the University of Minho) 

I.

The digital transformation has reconfigured the foundations of modern society, multiplying channels of communication, accelerating economic innovation, and redefining the exercise of citizenship.  However, the same technological developments that sustain progress have also created new vulnerabilities, giving rise to a new domain of criminality: cybercrime.  Within the European Union (EU), the protection of the digital sphere has thus become a constitutional concern, lying at the intersection of security policy, protection of fundamental rights, and market regulation.[1][2]

The concept of digital citizenship within the EU captures the recognition and protection of citizens’ rights and obligations in cyberspace, including privacy, freedom of speech and safe access to digital technologies.[3]  Cybercrime threatens these rights, ranging from data breaches to large-scale attacks on critical infrastructure, undermining citizen’s confidence in the Union’s capacity to ensure safety and accountability online.[4]  In this context, the 2024 Report on the State of Cybersecurity in the Union by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)[5][6][7] exposes a worrying rise in cyber incidents,[8] particularly ransomware, phishing, and artificial-intelligence-related crimes, accentuating the urgent need for coordinated legislative and operational responses at the Union level.[9]

Bruno Saraiva [master’s student in European Union Law and Digital Citizenship & Technological Sustainability (CitDig) scholarship holder])

Why the EU’s approach to AI development differs from that of the U.S. or China is a question that spans philosophy, sociology, geopolitics, and economics. But the simplest answer may be the following: they are different. Each polity carries distinct priorities, institutions, and constraints – and these differences translate into divergent AI trajectories.

In Europe, this divergence goes beyond regulation and economics; it extends to the very technical models being developed. While the U.S. and China pursue scale through ever-larger general-purpose systems, the EU has signaled a regulatory preference for limited models – special-purpose systems trained with curated data.

This post explores the methodological virtues of that approach. In a world where large models struggle with trust, reliability, and compliance with rights-based law, the EU’s strategy offers an alternative: models designed to minimise hallucinations, resist “model collapse”, and reduce opacity. By embedding rigor into training practices, the EU may not only advance trustworthy AI but also begin addressing its competitiveness woes, as underscored by the Draghi Report.[1]

Beatriz da Silva Pereira (master’s in European Union Law at the School of Law of University of Minho)

“Make fast fashion out of fashion” is the most recent slogan adopted by the European Commission to promote its new campaign to engage the Europeans in the battle against fast fashion and to raise public awareness about the EU Strategy for Sustainable and Circular Textiles.[1]

The EU Strategy for Sustainable and Circular Textiles arises within the scope of the much-quoted European Green Deal[2] launched in 2018, which marks the beginning of a new age in the environment protection across the EU and imposes a new perspective on the old principle of sustainability, which requires that all political and economic measures undertaken by the EU must consider the impacts and effects that those policies may have on the long run: on the economy, society and the climate.

This means that any initiative taken in order to satisfy a current need of the Europeans must be long-sighted and take in consideration the potential effect it may cause on the economic wealth of the Europeans, ideally resulting in economic growth, increasing monetary resources, in social peace, addressing inequalities, fostering the feeling of belonging and promoting an overall wellbeing to each and every individual, as well as a conscious impact on the environment, preserving ecosystems,  and repairing the damage already caused.

José Vegar Velho [Guest Lecturer at the School of Law of the University of Minho | Commissioner at the Portuguese Data Protection Authority (Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados – CNPD)]

On the 25th of March 2024, the Portuguese DPA – CNPD – issued a decision to temporarily limit the processing of biometric data relating to the processing operation for the collection of iris, eye, and face data in Portugal, that was being performed by a globally established private company, which, at the time, already had a direct impact on about 300,000 persons in said national territory.[1]

Such data was claimed to be the basis of a universal ID, to be used as proof of personhood and human condition, that is, establishing whether an individual is both human and unique – a digital ID.

This ID was presented as a global digital passport that guarantees people a way to preserve their privacy to authenticate themselves as humans online, in a world where intelligence is no longer a discriminator between people and AI.

Bruno Reynaud Sousa (Professor at School of Law of the University of Minho | JusGov Researcher in Space Law and Policy)

Introduction

During the 18th and 19th centuries, Great Britain’s undisputed dominance of the seas under Pax Britannica not only secured its economic and naval supremacy but also enabled it to export its legal norms worldwide.^[1] British admiralty courts and jurists, backed by the Royal Navy’s enforcement power, set precedents in maritime law that other nations gradually adopted.^[2] A notable example concerns landmark rulings by British courts in the late 18th century that established principles regarding neutral shipping rights and contraband, influencing international agreements such as the Declaration of Paris of 1856.^[3] Indeed, the Declaration of Paris, recognised as the first multilateral law-making treaty, was a compromise in which Britain conceded wider neutral rights in exchange for the abolition of privateering. At the time, as privateering was central to U.S. naval strategy in the event of conflict with the former colonial power, Britain secured a diplomatic victory by pushing for the closure of most global ports to privateers, effectively ending the practice.^[4]

In 1898, the Spanish-American War sparked a shift that eventually dethroned the Royal Navy’s supremacy and established the U.S. as the leading maritime power.^[5] America’s quick victory and subsequent naval expansion – symbolised by steel battleships and the global cruise of the Great White Fleet^[6] – transformed industrial might into blue-water reach and began a decades-long, peaceful transition from British to American dominance.^[7]