On the ailing transatlantic partnership and its impact on European integration 

Alessandra Silveira [Editor of this blog, Coordinator of Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence “Digital Citizenship and Technological Sustainability” (CitDig), University of Minho] and Pedro Froufe [Editor of this blog and Coordinator of the Group “Studies in European Union Law” (CEDU), of JUSGOV – Research Centre for Justice and Governance, University of Minho)]

The US National Security Strategy, presented at the beginning of December,^[1] is an official State Department document that sets out the fundamental guidelines for US diplomacy – in other words, it defines how the US will relate to the rest of the world over the next three years. The US National Security Strategy has been taken seriously over time – and in this text we will assume that we still live in a world where there are adults in the room, despite the volatility of the ideas put forward within the Trump Administration.^[2]  

What is the relevance of this new US Strategy for the world order?  The general feeling is that, if taken seriously, this Strategy reconfigures the concept of sovereignty in the 21st century.^[3] In other words, the Strategy officially recognises the existence of zones of vital interest, which the strongest states can naturally dispose of – a kind of division of the world into zones of influence. This would justify the prominence of the US in the so-called “Western Hemisphere”, as well as US access to strategically vital assets – wherever they may exist in the “Western Hemisphere”.

This suggests a revival of the old thesis of “living space” (“Lebensraum”) adopted and amplified with tragic consequences for all of humanity by Nazi Germany’s Third Reich.[4]  This is a geopolitical concept popularised in the 19th century by Friedrich Ratzel and taken up again in the 20th century by Karl Haushofer – whose ideas were exploited and used by the Third Reich. This idea of the indispensability of “living space” was also detected in Vladimir Putin’s narrative, especially in his justifications (at least in his initial ones) for the invasion of Ukraine by the forces of the Russian Federation.

“Readiness 2030” vs. “Disney power”

(European security and defence on the subject of the 72-hour survival kit)

Pedro Froufe [Editor of this blog and Key Staff Member of Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence “Digital Citizenship and Technological Sustainability” (CitDig)]

“Readiness 2030” is the new name for Europe’s security and defence plan. In fact, the specific programme, presented by the President of the Commission on 4 March, for a total amount of 800 billion euros, is called “SAFE”.  Thus, “Readiness 2030” is the overall plan – which includes “SAFE” – that aims to propel Europe towards a dimension of power, also of “hard-power”, capable of having “strategic autonomy” in matters of common security and defence.[1]

But what may be a curious note is the fact that this “Readiness 2030” plan has been renamed – insofar as Ursula von der Leyen initially presented it as simply the “ReArm Europe” plan. It was changed from “Rearmament” to “Readiness” under the influence of Italy and Spain. Giorgia Meloni made it clear that she did not like the term “rearmament”, as it would be a misleading name for citizens; Europeans are called upon to strengthen their defence capabilities, but that does not just mean buying arms in a trivial way. For Meloni, the focus should be broader, encompassing operability, essential services, energy infrastructures, supply chains – everything that cannot be done simply with weapons. Pedro Sánchez shared the same view, in the sense that “rearmament” would be an incomplete view of the problem of security and defence.

By Alexandre Veronese (Professor of University of Brasília, CitDig key external member, UMinho) and Alessandra Silveira [Editor of this blog, Coordinator of Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence “Digital Citizenship and Technological Sustainability” (CitDig), UMinho]

The dilemmas of content moderation in the European Union and Latin America: a new chapter?

            It was already known that Elon Musk’s direct participation in the presidential campaign that led to a second term for Donald Trump would have consequences for Big Tech regulation policies. However, one did not imagine that it would happen so quickly. The recent policy change by Meta – the parent company to which Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp belong – paves the way for other technology companies to seek ways to tacitly or explicitly “globalise” a broader interpretation of the concept of freedom of expression, according to the model of the United States of America.

            For Brazil – and other democracies in Latin America – that have had clashes with large digital platforms, the dilemma will increase. It is worth remembering what happened in Brazil. The social network X – former Twitter –, after its acquisition by Elon Musk, changed its content moderation policy. Thus, potentially offensive posts were released in certain countries. This process culminated in court orders from the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil to block posts and accounts. Invoking its terms of use of service, social network X refused to comply with such orders. That reaction caused the application to be blocked.[1] Subsequently, the social network X met the demands of that court – which acts as the Brazilian constitutional court – and the application was able to function again.[2]