Editorial of November 2016

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by Alessandra Silveira, Editor
and Sophie Perez Fernandes, Junior Editor

Unveiling the meaning of freedom of religion in the workplace

Two preliminary proceedings are currently pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) concerning the question of religious expression at work. In both cases, Achbita (C-157/15), originated in Belgium, and Bougnaoui (C-188/15), originated in France, the ECJ is called upon to rule on a highly sensitive issue – the wearing of Islamic headscarves (and not the full veil) in the workplace. The questions are fundamentally the following: is a private employer allowed to prohibit a female employee of Muslim faith from wearing a headscarf in the workplace?; is the dismissal of an employee who refuses to comply with such rules restricting the wearing of religious symbols at work unlawful?

It is the first time that the ECJ is called upon to address such questions. In the meantime, both AG Kokott (in Achbita) and AG Sharpston (in Bougnaoui) have rendered their opinions. The issues raised in both cases require the interpretation of the concept of ‘discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief’ within the meaning of the Anti-Discrimination Directive – the Directive 2000/78[i]. Both Advocates General concluded that a ban, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, could be regarded as indirect discrimination: the rules in question, although apparently neutral, were likely to put individuals of certain religions or beliefs at a particular disadvantage by comparison with other employees. Such discrimination may nevertheless be permitted if i) objectively justified by a legitimate aim, such as the interest of the employer’s business to enforce a policy of religious and ideological neutrality, and ii) so far as the principle of proportionality is observed (Article 2/2/b of Directive 2000/78).

However, the Advocates General disagree as to whether such a ban could be found as constituting direct discrimination (Article 2/2/a of Directive 2000/78). According to AG Kokott, a ban such as that at issue in Achbita could not be regarded as direct discrimination based on religion: a company rule prohibiting the wearing of visible signs of religious, political or philosophical beliefs, only creates a difference of treatment between employees who wish to give active expression to a particular belief and their colleagues who do not feel the same need. Thus, Ms Achbita had not been treated less favourably than another person on account of religion directly and specifically. On the contrary, AG Sharpston firstly concluded that Ms Bougnaoui’s dismissal amounted to direct discrimination against her on the basis of her religion as the right to manifest one’s religion is to be understood as an intrinsic part of the right to freedom of religion enshrined in both Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU). The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination is relevant as their possible justifications are different. In her analysis, AG Sharpston concluded that neither Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78, nor any of the other derogations from the prohibition of direct discrimination on grounds of religion which that directive lays down, applied.

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On the CJEU’s post-Brexit case-law on European citizenship. The recovery of the identity Ariadne’s thread?

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by Professor Alessandra Silveira, Editor

The CJEU over the years has helped forging a concept of citizenship directed to be the “fundamental status of Member States nationals”. However, since the ruling Dereci of 2011, the proactivity of the CJEU concerning the development of the European citizenship seemed to have gradually exhausted its potentialities, mostly on the so-called social citizenship. It happens, tough, that the crucial moment the European Union faces demands the enhancement of its vertical relation with the citizens it upholds – it is either this or fragmentation. And maybe this is the subliminal message from the CJEU in three post-Brexit rulings that, decided in the Grand Chamber, surprisingly recover and develop the most emblematic case-law about the European citizenship – namely the Rottmann[i] and Zambrano[ii] rulings – whose political potential and/or identity potential seemed irrevocably muzzled.

In the ruling Rendón Marín[iii] and CS[iv], the core issue involved the expulsion and the automatic refusal of the concession of residence to third states nationals who have a dependent minor European citizen – in  both cases due to the parent’s criminal records. The CJEU recovered the Zambrano assertion, according to which Article 20, TFEU precludes national provisions that have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union[v] and, in this sense, it must be attributed the derived right of residence to the national from a third State, under this risk of the useful effect of the European citizenship being affected, if the minor is forced to leave the territory of the Union to follow his/her parent[vi]. In both rulings, the novelty is the way the CJEU appreciates, in the light of the fundamental rights of the European citizen, the possibility of a Member State to introduce limits to such derived right of residence which arises from Article 20, TFEU.

Continue reading “On the CJEU’s post-Brexit case-law on European citizenship. The recovery of the identity Ariadne’s thread?”

On the CJEU’s case-law concerning the “social tourism” that preceded the Brexit referendum – between forces of cohesion and fragmentation

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by Professor Alessandra Silveira, Editor

One week prior to the scheduled date of the referendum about the UK leaving the EU a ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union was published. The decision was to dismiss an action for failure to fulfil an obligation (article 258, TFEU) which had been filed by the European Commission against the UK seeking the conviction of such Member State for violating the prohibition of non-discrimination on ground of nationality[i]. Throughout the year of 2008, the European Commission received several complaints by citizens from other Member States living in the UK with objections about the refusal of British authorities to provide them social benefits due to the absence of proof of the right to reside. Following that, the EC accused the UK of not fulfilling the Regulation 883/2004 (on the coordination of social security systems) because it subjected the applicants of certain social benefits – namely the dependent child allowance or the child tax credit – to the so-called test of right to reside. The Commission considered that requirement incompatible with the meaning of the mentioned Regulation – once it makes reference to a habitual residence and not a legal residence – and, simultaneously, discriminatory towards the nationals from other Member States as such requirement is automatically fulfilled by the British nationals living in the UK.

The core of the case was to evaluate if a Member State’s permission to attribute certain social benefits only to the people who legally reside in its territory is in itself discriminatory under the terms of article 4 of the Regulation 883/2004. Under the title “equality of treatment”, the article states that, unless otherwise provided for by the own Regulation, persons to whom it applies shall enjoy the same benefits and be subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals thereof. All in all, in every situation comprised by the ratione materiae domain of application of the EU Law, any European citizen may invoke the prohibition of discrimination on ground of nationality which shows in article 18, TFEU and it is materialised in article 4 of the Regulation 883/2004. Those situations include the ones deriving from the exercise of the freedom to move and to reside in the territory of the Member States, which are laid in articles 20 (2), 1º§, a) and 21, TFEU.

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Editorial of October 2016

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by Sophie Perez Fernandes, Junior Editor

Engaging EU liability within the European Stability Mechanism framework

Last September 20th, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered two judgments regarding the role of the European Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Central Bank, in the negotiation and signing of the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) during the 2012-2013 financial crisis, and, in particular, in the restructuring of the banking sector in Cyprus imposed as a condition for the grant of financial assistance.

In Mallis and Malli (Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P), actions were brought against the European Commission and the European Central Bank for the annulment of the Eurogroup’s statement of 25 March 2013 concerning, inter alia, the restructuring of the banking sector in Cyprus. In turn, in Ledra Advertising (Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P), depositors of two large Cypriot banks brought actions against the European Commission and the European Central Bank for the partial annulment of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 adopted jointly by the ESM and the Republic of Cyprus and also for compensation for damages allegedly suffered following the request for financial assistance and the ensuing restructuring of the two banks in question.

The ECJ had already been called upon to rule on judicial protection questions raised by the ESM framework. Created in order to provide, where needed, financial assistance to the Member States whose currency is the euro, the ESM was instituted through an international agreement between euro area Member States – the Treaty establishing the ESM, concluded in Brussels the 2th February 2012, in force since the 27th September 2012. Thus, the ESM Treaty is not part of the EU legal order, as confirmed by the ECJ in the famous Pringle judgment (C-370/12). As a consequence, when creating the ESM, or acting within its framework, Member States do not act within the scope of application of EU law for the purposes, in particular, of Article 51(1) CFREU. Individuals seeking to challenge Member States’ measures adopted pursuant the conditions laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding would not, therefore, find in the preliminary ruling mechanism an indirect means of access to the ECJ in order to assess their compliance with EU law and, in particular, the CFREU as the former was not in question and the latter was hence out of reach.

What the above mentioned judgments, and especially Ledra Advertising, emphasize is the link nonetheless existing between the ESM framework and the EU legal order. Quoting Alicia Hinarejos (EU Law Analysis), in order to carry out its functions, the ESM “borrows” two EU institutions, the European Commission and the European Central Bank, two thirds of the infamously known Troika. The question is whether (and, if so, when) EU institutions’ actions within the ESM framework might be reviewed and, when harmful, give rise to compensation under EU law and, in particular, in light of the CFREU.

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Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 8 June 2016, on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure – brief analysis

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by Ana Margarida Pereira, Collaborating Member of CEDU

The differences in the Member States’ legislation regarding the protection of trade secrets against their unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure, the lack of consistency regarding the civil law remedies available and the differences regarding the treatment to give to a third party who has acquired the trade secret in good faith but subsequently learns that the acquisition derived from a previous unlawful acquisition by another party are some of the reasons that justified European action  regarding the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets).

Such differences were, for many years,  a reason for the fragmentation of the internal market and for the weakening of the overall deterrent effect of the relevant rules applicable. This legal framework lead to a decrease of innovation- related cross-border activity and, naturally, to a decrease of European Union’s intellectual production.  In order to provide rules at Union level regarding the harmonization of the protection of know-how and trade secrets it was necessary to elaborate and publish Directive (EU) 2016/943.

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Summary of Comission v. Belgium – C-275/83

by José Ricardo Sousa, student of the Master's degree in EU Law of UMinho

Keywords: Social Security; Pensions; Regulation; Resident

Court: CJEU| DateMarch 28th 1983 | Case: C-275/83 | Applicants: European Comission vs Belgium

Summary:  European Comission brought an action pursuant the article 169 of the EEC Treaty against Beligum for disrespect of the obligations under article 33 of regulation n. 1408/71 that involves the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families. The mentioned article provides that pension’s deductions may be made by an institution of a Member State only for people in these conditions: maternity leave or sickness. However this deductions have to be made by an institution of this Member State wherever could be the actual residence of one persons within the EU. CJEU concluded that the law in force was not comply with the requirements of Community Law.

The decision can be acessed here and the opinion of AG here.

Summary of Cassis Dijon – C-120/78

by José Ricardo Sousa, student of the Master's degree in EU Law of UMinho

Keywords: Common Market; Spirit Drinks, Importation, Minimum Content, Cassis Dijon

Court: CJEU| Date:  Feb. 20th 1979 | Case: C-120/78 | Applicants: Rewe-Zentral AG vs Bundesmonopolverwaltung Für Branntwein

Summary:  Rene-Zentral is a central cooperative undertaking that imports good from other Member States. On 14th September 1976 the company requested authorization for Bundesmonopolverwaltung (Federal Monopoly Administration for Spirits) to import a spirit drink called “Cassis Dijon”. Administration told to Rene-Zentral that there was no need to ask for authorization to import goods, however “Cassis Dijon” couldn’t be sold in Germany because the spirit drink didn’t fulfil the requirements of alcohol (wine-spirits must be around 32% and the mentioned mark had around 20%). Rene claimed that the German provision represented a restriction for the free movement of goods and contrary to article 30 and 37 of the EEC Treaty. Rene brought an action against the decision and the Court suspended the action and referred the following questions to CJEU:

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Between the competition law and a competition culture: the case of Apple/Ireland

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by Ana Filipa Afonseca, student of the Master´s degree in EU Law of UMinho

The importance of Apple’s case emerged when the journalist of the Irish Times asked the European Commission representative, Margrethe Vestager, in the press conference about the illegality of the aid provided by Ireland to Apple Sales International, if the Union wouldn’t be afraid of losing the investment of external companies with such sanctions. The answer given, without lyricism, made clear that the lesson wasn’t well-examined, after all, she simply answered “this is not a penalty, this is unpaid taxes”. The state aid prohibition read in the 107º TFEU conforms one of the most important competition laws, given that this mechanism contradicts the previous protectionist rules, inherent to the state individualism, in which the national independence was established through favouring State domestic economy to the detriment of other economies. Therefore, this response was surgical: urges the time for the Member States to finally consider the internal market as a single market, defined by the fair competition and this will be the main catch for future investment. Above all, the competition law demands an important shift of thought by the Member States – today we are not one.

The case Apple/Ireland raises several questions. Primarily, it takes into account the mould of the State aid, due to the fact that this is not a direct measure of tax exemption, fiscal guarantee, preferential  tax interest , favourable deals in the land acquisition, special rates, as in most cases, the Irish measure translates in a broad sense, in a advantage (expression used in the Case Italy versus European Commission 2nd of July of 1974, Process 173/73) that benefits the economic operator. The illegal aid converts into splitting of profit between Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe which the result implies that the Irish branch office would be subjected to the normal taxation of Irish companies, however, the head office where most of the profit was allocated, was not subjected to any kind of taxation and this was possible under the Irish tax law, which until 2013 allowed for so called ‘Stateless Companies’.

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Summary of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft – 11/70

by José Ricardo Sousa, student of the Master's degree in EU Law of UMinho

Keywords: Deposit, Export licence, force majeure

Court: CJEU| DateDecember 12nd 1970 | Case: 11/70 | Applicants: Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH vs Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel

Summary:  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft is an import-export undertaking. The company obtained 20 000 metric tons of maize meal with validity until 31st December 1967. According to article 12 of Regulation No 120/67 in what concerns to market of cereals. When the licence expired and the company delivered approximately 11 000 metric tons of cereal. After, Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel declared the deposit forfeited according to Regulation No 473/67/EEC. The undertaking brought an action to court against this decision. The Court suspended the action and sent to CJEU the following questions:

Are the obligation to export, laid down in the third subparagraph of Article 12 (1) of Regulation No 120/67/EEC of the Council of 13 June 1967, the lodging of a deposit, upon which such obligation is made conditional, and forfeiture of the deposit, where exportation is not effected during the period of validity of the export licence, legal? Continue reading “Summary of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft – 11/70”

Summary of Vassen Göbells – C-61/65

by José Ricardo Sousa, student of the Master's degree in EU Law of UMinho

Keywords: Pension, Sickness, Enforceable provisions, Survivors

Court: CJEU| DateDecember 10th 1965 | Case: C-61/65 | Applicants: Mrs Vassen vs Management of the Beambtendfonds voor het Mijnbedrif, Heerlen

Summary: Mrs Vassen was a widow of a mining employer. She was receiving a pension from a pension fund of the social secutrity (BFM), who placed her as a member of a sickness fund. On 31st August 1963 she went to live in Germany. She asked to remove her name from the list, and so the BFM replied saying that her name wasn’t on the list since she went to live in Germany. When Mrs Vassen asked to re-enter on the list, BFM rejected. The Court suspended the works and referred the following question to CJEU:

Is the scheme laid … to be regarded as legislation, as defined in Article 1 (b) of Regulation No 3 and mentioned in Article 4 thereof? Furthermore can the said scheme governing sickness expenses be classified as ‘sickness insurance for mine workers (benefits in cash and in kind in the event of sickness and maternity)’ listed at (i) under the heading ‘Netherlands’ in Annex B to Regulation No 3, to which Article 3 of the said Regulation refers? Thus does Regulation No 3 (and also Regulation No 4) apply to non-manual workers employed in the Netherlands mining industry to whomthe said scheme governing sickness expenses is applicable?
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