Artificial intelligence: 2020 A-level grades in the UK as an example of the challenges and risks

by Piedade Costa de Oliveira (Former official of the European Commission - Legal Service)
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed are purely personal and are the exclusive responsibility of the author. They do not reflect any position of the European Commission

The use of algorithms for automated decision-making, commonly referred to as Artificial Intelligence (AI), is becoming a reality in many fields of activity both in the private and public sectors.

It is common ground that AI raises considerable challenges not only for the area for which it is operated in but also for society as a whole. As pointed out by the European Commission in its White Paper on AI[i], AI entails a number of potential risks, such as opaque decision-making, gender-based bias or other kinds of discrimination or intrusion on privacy.

In order to mitigate such risks, Article 22 of the GDPR confers on data subjects the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing which produces legal effects concerning them or similarly significantly affects them[ii].

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The “mandatory” contact-tracing App “StayAway COVID” – a matter of European Union Law

by Alessandra Silveira, Joana Covelo de Abreu (Editors) and Tiago Sérgio Cabral (Managing Editor)

1. During the previous week there as been plenty of controversy regarding a proposal by the Portuguese Government to make the installation of the App “StayAway COVID” (“App”) – a mobile contact-tracing application designed to fight the pandemic – mandatory for large sections of the population. While the Government appears to have backed down from this idea (for now) the issue of European Union Law (“EU Law”) has been surprisingly absent from most of the debate around a measure of this nature, even though it should be front and centre and precedes even the issue of constitutionality.

As we will show in this text, it is difficult to argue against the conclusion that this subject should be considered as a matter of EU Law – and, consequently, that this is a question of fundamental rights protected by the European Union (“EU”). In the EU’s legal framework, privacy and personal data protection are fundamental rights enshrined within Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU). Since it is a matter regulated at EU level, the EU’s standard of fundamental rights’ protection is applicable before and above even the national constitutional standards of protection[i]. So, this is not just a Portuguese constitutional problem that can be solved in the light of the Portuguese Constitution – it is an issue of relevance to all European citizens which needs to be resolved in the light of the EU´s (jus)fundamental standards (see Article 51 CFREU).[ii] It is important to be aware that the Court of Justice of the EU (“ECJ”), in the past, struck down constitutional provisions from Member States to ensure the adequate protection of fundamental rights of privacy and personal data protection[iii]. This is because all Member States do not have the same level of (jus)fundamental protection.

2. Under the current legal framework in the EU, enforcing the use of any contact-tracing application to the general public (or to large sections of the general public such as the entire population inserted within the labour market, academia, schools and public administration) would always face some serious challenges.

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The latest on the Zambrano front – the Chavez-Vilchez judgment

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by Sophie Perez Fernandes, Junior Editor

Back in 2011, the ECJ delivered a pivotal decision in the Zambrano case. With reference to the Rottmann case, the ECJ held that “Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.”

By this criterion are included within the scope of application of EU law situations which, a priori, fall within the competence of the Member States (the so-called purely internal situations). The Zambrano-criterion indeed allows EU citizens to rely on their status as EU citizens against their own Member States of nationality even when they have not exercised their rights of free movement. The immediate consequence of the Zambrano ruling was to preclude Member States (in casu, Belgium) from refusing third country national parents of minor EU citizens a right of residence in the Member State of residence and nationality of those children in so far as such decisions would result in the children having to leave the territory of the Union as a whole.

The subsequent case-law gave a rather narrow interpretation to the criterion, as can be confirmed by the judgments delivered in McCarthy, Dereci, Iida, O and S, Ymeraga, Alokpa and NA. The ECJ held the Zambrano-criterion as a specific criterion as it relates to “very specific situations” in which a right of residence may not, exceptionally, be refused to a third country national without the EU citizenship enjoyed by (minor) Member States nationals being (fundamentally) undermined. It thus follows that any right of residence conferred on third country nationals pursuant to Article 20 TFEU are rights derived from those enjoyed by the EU citizen of which they are members of the family and have, in particular, “an intrinsic connection with the freedom of movement and residence of a Union citizen”.

Without calling into question or reversing this line of jurisprudence, the ECJ seems however willing to revive the Zambrano-criterion in more recent cases, addressing some issues so far left in the open. In CS and Rendón Marín, though admitting the possibility of limiting the derived right of residence flowing from Article 20 TFEU to third country nationals (limitation based on grounds of public policy or public security), the ECJ framed the scope of such a limitation, making its application conditional on a case-by-case analysis and upon respect for fundamental rights as protected by the CFREU, namely Articles 7 and 24(2) CFREU. The ECJ further clarified the scope of the Zambrano-criterion as the ultimate link with EU law for the purposes of the protection of fundamental rights in the Chavez-Vilchez judgment delivered last week.
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