Brexit is going to happen, but…

by João Alexandre Guimarães, Erasmus student at UMinho

The New York Times says the British government’s plan for leaving the European Union was thrown into uncertainty on Thursday after the High Court ruled that Parliament must give its approval before the process can begin. “The court’s decision seemed likely to slow — but not halt — the British withdrawal from the bloc, a step approved by nearly 52 percent of voters in a June referendum. Nevertheless, the court’s decision was a significant blow to Prime Minister Theresa May“.

She had planned to begin the legal steps for leaving the European Union by the end of March, and to prepare for the negotiations over Britain’s exit mostly behind closed doors. If the court’s ruling is upheld — the government immediately vowed to appeal — that plan would be thrown into disarray, analysts said.

On CNN (also here), Jane Marrick says, this does not have to expose Britain’s detailed negotiating position with Brussels, but it should allow our democratically elected representatives to scrutinize the broad terms. It will also give the 48% who voted Remain — 16 million people — a voice that under the government’s plans they are currently denied.

Eleanor Garnier, from BBC, said this decision has huge implications, not just on the timing of Brexit but on the terms of Brexit. That’s because it’s given the initiative to those on the Remain side in the House of Commons who, it’s now likely, will argue Article 50 can only be triggered when Parliament is ready and that could mean when they’re happy with the terms of any future deal. Of course, it will be immensely difficult to satisfy and get agreement from all those MPs who voted to remain. Could an early general election be on the cards after all? , via BBC.

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On the CJEU’s post-Brexit case-law on European citizenship. The recovery of the identity Ariadne’s thread?

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by Professor Alessandra Silveira, Editor

The CJEU over the years has helped forging a concept of citizenship directed to be the “fundamental status of Member States nationals”. However, since the ruling Dereci of 2011, the proactivity of the CJEU concerning the development of the European citizenship seemed to have gradually exhausted its potentialities, mostly on the so-called social citizenship. It happens, tough, that the crucial moment the European Union faces demands the enhancement of its vertical relation with the citizens it upholds – it is either this or fragmentation. And maybe this is the subliminal message from the CJEU in three post-Brexit rulings that, decided in the Grand Chamber, surprisingly recover and develop the most emblematic case-law about the European citizenship – namely the Rottmann[i] and Zambrano[ii] rulings – whose political potential and/or identity potential seemed irrevocably muzzled.

In the ruling Rendón Marín[iii] and CS[iv], the core issue involved the expulsion and the automatic refusal of the concession of residence to third states nationals who have a dependent minor European citizen – in  both cases due to the parent’s criminal records. The CJEU recovered the Zambrano assertion, according to which Article 20, TFEU precludes national provisions that have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union[v] and, in this sense, it must be attributed the derived right of residence to the national from a third State, under this risk of the useful effect of the European citizenship being affected, if the minor is forced to leave the territory of the Union to follow his/her parent[vi]. In both rulings, the novelty is the way the CJEU appreciates, in the light of the fundamental rights of the European citizen, the possibility of a Member State to introduce limits to such derived right of residence which arises from Article 20, TFEU.

Continue reading “On the CJEU’s post-Brexit case-law on European citizenship. The recovery of the identity Ariadne’s thread?”

The voters have spoken. Brexit it is.

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by Catherine Barnard, Professor of European Union Law 
and the Jean Monnet Chair of EU Law 
in the Faculty of Law at the University of Cambridge

The voters have spoken. Brexit it is.

But what does Brexit in fact mean? Pulling up the drawbridge altogether or entering some special relationship with the EU? One possibility would be adopting EU law-lite, through membership of the European Economic Area. The UK would retain access to the single market but would still have to pay a membership fee and probably accept free movement of persons, at least in a modified form. What about free trade agreements like the one the EU has with Canada (which is not yet ratified)? But what would this mean for the UK’s flourishing services sector? There are some unpalatable choices ahead for politicians to make.

Meanwhile, there are some important constitutional questions to be addressed. What is required to trigger Article 50 TEU, the legal provision for a country to leave the European Union? Can the Prime Minister do it by way of the exercise of her prerogative (inherent) powers or will there need to be an Act of Parliament? This issue is currently being litigated in the British courts.

Once triggered, how long will the negotiation process take? The Article envisages two years, but with the possibility of an extension but only by unanimous agreement. How will the negotiations fit in with the elections in France and Germany when their leaders have their eye on domestic matters? Can the UK civil service, 25% smaller than in 2005, cope with the severe strains that Brexit will put it under? And what about the position of Scotland and Northern Ireland?

The Brexit vote was the easy bit. The hard work is about to begin.

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Picture credits: ‘Brexit, Polling station sign for the EU referendum vote’, by Ungry Young Man.

A Perspective on Brexit

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by Elaine Dewhurst, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Manchester

and Dimitrios Doukas, Reader in Law, University of Manchester

If there are two words that characterise the sentiments of many British-based academics anticipating Brexit, they would be ‘uncertainty’ and ‘sadness’. In the widest sense, there is uncertainty about the future of the EU as a project, and the place of non-British EU citizens living in the United Kingdom. Since the referendum result, the careers and livelihoods of those who benefit from EU research funding and collaboration and/or whose expertise lies predominantly or exclusively in areas of EU law have been marred by fear and doubt. Within the legal profession, for example, UK lawyers face an uphill challenge of seeking admission to a second Bar or Law Society, such as in Ireland, to enable them to continue enjoying the freedom to provide their services within the EU. Within legal academia, there is much speculation surrounding the furtherance of existing research projects, and recent studies suggest that collaborations and funding are at risk of termination as a result of the referendum. In addition, there is uncertainty over whether a post-Brexit Britain will retain a migration stream for academics which would match the free movement principles in terms of its encouragement of cross-border movement. For many, it is not just the professional difficulties that may deter academics from working in Britain. Some also have considered leaving Britain as they fear (or have already experienced) a rise in racism and xenophobia, a problem which may also discourage others from seeking work in Britain. More widely than this, there is fear of increasing and unchecked populist politics and anti-immigrant sentiment in the United Kingdom, an apprehension heightened because of Britain’s unadulterated majoritarian democracy in which EU law with its extensive judicial controls has heretofore performed an enforceable moderating influence. Uncertainty also mars the student experience. British universities have, and continue to, benefit financially and culturally from the many EU students who come to Britain every year to study. Reports suggest that the numbers of EU students applying to British universities has dropped since the referendum, and existing students have had to receive assurances as regards their position. Equally affected by this uncertainty are those British students wishing to participate in Erasmus programmes (a programme which has already benefitted over 200,000 British students).

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Editorial August 2016

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by Katarzyna Gromek-Broc, Senior Lecturer, 
Senior Advisor for Academic Matters,
University of York

[The Editorial team is pleased to annouce that this Editorial and following two articles resume perspectives from British schoolars on Brexit].

Brexit

The 23rd of June 2016 marks an unprecedented moment in British and European history.  A moment that everybody feared, but nobody really believed would actually happen. The moment is heart-breaking: British people decided to abandon the European Project. The results of the referendum of the 23rd of June ‘to leave the EU’ – expressed by 51.9% to 48.1% out of 72.2% of the electorate – symbolised the end of an era lasting 44 years of the UK in the EU.[1] Birkinshaw declared that ‘in the morning after the referendum the country was is in a state of shock’, intensified by the initial calculations of the results, which indicated a slightly pro-Europe advantage.[2]  Although the shift in outcome was predictable since the first results available were from the City of London – a bastion of pro-Europe campaign – backed up by some other dynamic cities, including Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Brighton, Manchester and Bristol, with notably high concentrations of intellectual minded adults, as well as young people. The referendum divided Britain geographically and broke the link between the generations. The younger people were in majority in the ‘Remain campaign’.  My region – Yorkshire – sadly voted overwhelmingly to leave.[3] Almost all of the key cities, including Sheffield, Hull, Bradford, Hambleton, North Lincolnshire, Rotherham and Selby, decided to withdraw from the EU, with just a few exceptions, such as Harrogate (51%) and York (58%).[4]

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Brexit and the European Football Market: The Consequences for the Premier League and the British Players

by Rita de Sousa Costa, law student at UMinho
and Tiago Sérgio Cabral, law student at UMinho

The results of the referendum held in Great Britain on the 23rd of June of 2016 shall certainly change the course of history. On this day “Brexit” trumped “Bremain” by 52% against 48% with a turnout of about 72%. And while the results of the referendum are not binding it does seem that the British government plans to respect the will of the voters.

Leaving the EU will affect not only the economy but every single aspect of the lives of the British people, including sports. The British love sports, mainly football, and Britain, more precisely England has one of most competitive football leagues in the world: the Premier League. Nigel Farage a top UK politician and one of the most prominent leave supporters said in April:

What this referendum is about is taking back control of our lives, our laws and our borders”.

However, we must ask ourselves what are the consequences of “taking back our laws and borders” for the Premier League?

Farage is a supporter of Crystal Palace, whose team is composed of 32 players, and 12 of those players are not British. Manchester United, the winner of the FA Cup, regularly plays with 7 non-British players on its line-up even if in total it has more than 50% British players on its roster. How will the Premier League survive after Brexit? Will its teams agree with Farage’s statement “outside of this single market we will be better off” (here)?
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“Out is out” (including in relation to the Mediterranean diet…). On the Article 50 of the European Union Treaty in the light of the federative principle of European loyalty

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by Professor Alessandra Silveira, Editor

Since Abraham Lincoln faced the hardest constitutional crisis of the USA (War of Secession, 1861-1865) the modern legal theory of federative systems had taken for granted that the hypothesis of secession was repelled. And then the Canadian Supreme Court reframed the data. In the country, in 1995, a referendum was called on the unilateral declaration of secession of Québec. The proposal of separation was reject by a short difference – 50,58% of the votes in a turnout of 94%. Following the referendum the federal government appealed to the Supreme Court to know if a unilateral secession, addressed in a popular consultation not approved by the remaining States, would violate the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that a unilateral secession with those features would infringe the Constitution. However, if in a different referendum, when answering a “clear question”, the “clear majority” of the Québécoise casted an unequivocal will of not integrating Canada anymore, then the remaining States and the federal government would be bonded to negotiate with Québec the conditions for its withdrawal because unwritten constitutional principles determined it (Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217). In the aftermath the federal government passed in the Canadian Parliament “clear” rules tending to regulate and calculate the “price” of withdrawal, especially to safeguard the legitimate interest of the remaining States and their population – as a result, Québec still integrates the federation. Punch line: in a federative system there are neither free lunches nor free exits.

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Editorial of July 2016

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by Professor Alessandra Silveira, Editor

Every cloud has a silver lining. On the referendum able to push forward the unity of the Europe and the disunity of the Kingdom

Modern democracy, with which the West has lived since the liberal revolutions, is representative – exceptionally accompanied by moments of semi-direct democracy through referenda or popular consultations. Such exceptionality is based on the very survival of democracy as referenda hardly ever manage to escape high doses of manipulation and abuse. When Hans Kelsen was asked once about the rightfulness of popular consultation, he allegedly answered that, despite they make sense in certain situations, it should not be forgotten that an uninformed population preferred Barabbas over Jesus Christ. This metaphor illustrates one of the main assumptions of the democratic theory (which no one described as brilliantly as Norberto Bobbio): the excess of democracy may kill it.

This becomes crystal clear in the referenda (supposedly) on European issues, tendentiously instrumentalized by national political elites that convert them in arenas to internal disputes. The day the world awaked in astonishment with the results of the British referendum, the top questions at the social networks and search engines in the United Kingdom on the European Union since the Brexit result was officially announced were: “What is the European Union? What does it mean to leave the European Union?” That reveals that many British have voted without really knowing what the EU is or what it stands for in their daily life.

And so 17 million British, deceived by the most despicable demagogy, decided about the destinies of 500 million European, subverting the most elementary democratic rule of a polity – the one of majority will. They did so openly for the worst reasons – fear, hostility, xenophobia, all wrapped in the sovereignty narrative –, offering weapons for the Leftist and Rightist populisms all over Europe to wield a speech against the Brussels’ technocracy. The same technocracy that will stop paying grants to British agriculturists, that will cease supporting research in the British universities, that will discontinue the stimulation for the movement of British Erasmus students, that will interrupt law-making towards promoting equality and non-discrimination among the British.
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On the world of yesterday, witches and ghosts

 

by Professor Alessandra Silveira, Editor

(text in the memory of Jo Cox, British MP, 41, upholder of refugees’ rights and the continuation of United Kingdom in the EU, who was appallingly killed on 16th June).

Jo Cox’s murder was a senseless attack on democracy itself“, via The Telegraph.

Jo Cox MP death: David Cameron and Jeremy Corbyn unite in tributes“, via BBC.

Jo Cox death: ‘The well of hatred killed her,’ Corbyn says – latest updates“, via The Guardian.

Jo Cox’s tragic death may halt pro-Brexit momentum, analysts say“, via CNBC.

The price of caring“, via The Economist blog.

Jo Cox’s death should make us reflect on our polluted, abusive politics“, via Mirror.

After Jo Cox’s Killing (…)“, via The Wall Street Journal.

Before the adversities we have been facing in Europe lately – financial speculation, migratory boom, terrorism, Euroscepticism, populism, intolerance, Brexit, etc. – sometimes it seems it could not get worse. A sort of perfect storm, as it is said. But it can always get worse. In fact, it was worse in the past. We can acknowledge that by simply reading Stefan Zweig’s memoirs, The World of Yesterday. In it the author gives us a nostalgic picture of a missing world, the one of Europe pre-1914 which is opposed to heinous period of the wars, interleaved by a short time of peace and hope in the European renaissance. It was during the exile in England, and then Brazil, where the Jewish Austrian wrote his memories – as well as the iconic Brazil, land of the future, in deep demonstration of gratitude to the country that hosted him.

At this time of profound consternation due to the harrowing assassination of Jo Cox, this “world of yesterday” described by a war refugee in the end of the 1930s proves that there is still space for a normative approach of the European integration process, inclined to create solutions that help neutralize the fragmentation forces against which the Union is being confronted, and mobilize its cohesion forces.

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A realpolitik, inside view of the Social Security negotiations in the EU on “Brexit”

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by Elisabete Silveira, Director of Negotiation and Coordination of International Instruments Unit of Directorate-General of Social Security in Portugal

After long and difficult discussions, the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council of 18-19 February 2016, adopted a Decision concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union.

It will become effective on the date the United Kingdom informs the Council about its decision to remain a member of the EU and will require secondary legislation which the Commission will only propose after a successful referendum. Should the result of the referendum in the UK be for it to leave the EU, the set of arrangements agreed by the European Council will cease to exist.

The Decision covers four sections: Economic Governance, Competitiveness, Sovereignty and Social Benefits and Free Movement.

Focusing only on the last section, it should be noted that, following the taking effect of the Decision, the Commission will submit proposals for amending two important Regulations: Regulation (EC) N.º 883/2004 on coordination of social security schemes and Regulation (EU) N.º 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the EU.

The amendment of Regulation (EC) N.º 883/2004 is intended to give Member States, as regards the “exportation of child benefits to a Member State other than that where the worker resides, an option to index such benefits to the conditions of the Member State where the child resides. This should apply only to new claims made by EU workers in the host Member State. However, as from 1 January 2020, all Member States may extend indexation to existing claims to child benefits already exported by EU workers. The Commission does not intend to propose that the future system of optional indexation of child benefits be extended to other types of exportable benefits, such as old-age pensions.”

These arrangements raise many doubts and perplexities.

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