By the Alessandra Silveira
▪
On inferred personal data and the difficulties of EU law in dealing with this matter
The right not to be subject to automated decisions was considered for the first time before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the recent SCHUFA judgment. Article 22 GDPR (on individual decisions based solely on automated processing, including profiling) always raised many doubts to legal scholars:[1] i) what a decision taken “solely” on the basis of automated processing would be?; ii) would this Article provide for a right or, rather, a general prohibition whose application does not require the party concerned to actively invoke a right?; iii) to what extent this automated decision produces legal effects or significantly affects the data subject in a similar manner?; iv) will the provisions of Article 22 GDPR only apply where there is no relevant human intervention in the decision-making process?; v) if a human being examines and weighs other factors when making the final decision, will it not be made “solely” based on the automated processing? [and, in this situation, will the prohibition in Article 22(1) GDPR not apply]?
To these doubts a German court has added a few more. SCHUFA is a private company under German law which provides its contractual partners with information on the creditworthiness of third parties, in particular, consumers. To that end, it establishes a prognosis on the probability of a future behaviour of a person (‘score’), such as the repayment of a loan, based on certain characteristics of that person, on the basis of mathematical and statistical procedures. The establishment of scores (‘scoring’) is based on the assumption that, by assigning a person to a group of other persons with comparable characteristics who have behaved in a certain way, similar behaviour can be predicted.[2]
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