The Italy–Albania Protocol on migration management: between new schemes of asylum externalisation and risks of systematic violations

Valentina Faggiani (Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at University of Granada) 
           

The trend towards the externalisation of migratory policy has been reaffirmed in the recent Italy–Albania Protocol, whose objective is to institute a new model. This Protocol aims at intervening to overcome a real problem: the systemic crisis of asylum that Italy is suffering. The idea that inspires it and the scheme are clear and have some original profiles: if the situation in the reception centres in Italy is unsustainable, why not transfer migrants in irregular situation and asylum seekers to reception centres instituted outside the Italian territory, but managed, controlled and financed by Italy? In this country, particularly in frontline areas such as Lampedusa, on the one hand, foreigners suffer serious and systematic violations of fundamental rights; on the other hand, there has been a strong feeling of uneaseamong the local population, who live in an unsafe environment characterised by the proliferation of criminality and situation of violence.

The idea has the characteristic of extrema ratio: the purpose of building a new model of migratory flux management. Regarding the innovation profiles, it is interesting to observe that in this case Italy does is not delegating, as it did in the Memorandum of Understanding with Libia, the liability for controlling the fluxes and for pushing back the migrants to their country of origin, but it assumes the management of all phases, and it extends the jurisdiction and the cost that it implies. It is a much more extensive and complex project. Indeed, the political and economic context of Albania apparently offers more guarantees than other countries.

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The New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum: from political (dis)agreements to a last chance

Inês Neves (Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Porto | Researcher at CIJ | Member of the Jean Monnet Module team DigEUCit ) and Rita Ferreira Gomes (Associate at Morais Leitão)
           

Setting the scene

From 2020 onwards, migration and asylum have been central to both national and European Union (‘EU’) political agendas. 2023, however, was key and ended with major challenges for 2024.

By the end of 2023, the European Parliament and the Council had reached a political agreement on several key proposals included in the (New) Pact on Migration and Asylum[1] (‘New Pact’), in particular, Proposals for Regulations: i) introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders[2] (‘Screening Regulation’); ii) on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’[3] (‘Eurodac Regulation’); iii) on a common procedure for international protection in the Union[4] (‘Asylum Procedures Regulation’); iv) on asylum and migration management[5] (‘Asylum Migration Management Regulation’), and v) addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum[6] (‘Crisis and Force majeure Regulation’).

Some question whether “the legislative proposals [will] have the same fate as the reform package that had been presented by the Commission in 2016[7]. Others see the New Pact as a final opportunity to get it right, or at least deserving of “a chance to succeed[8]. In her 2023 State of the Union speech, President von der Leyen referred to a “historic opportunity to get it over the line”, and compassionately, urged us all to get it done and prove that “Europe can manage migration effectively and with compassion[9].

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A specter is haunting Spain — the specter of illiberalism: A young democracy facing its ghosts

Rubén Díez (Professor of Sociology at Complutense University)
           

Populism shows a natural tendency to strain the independence of public functions, the autonomy of civil society and media, as well as the institutional mechanisms regulating the civil sphere in liberal democracies. Obama reminded us of this during the funeral of Republican John McCain in September 2018, implicitly referring to President Trump. A portion of Obama’s eulogy highlighted the rules and principles of rational-legal legitimization that govern our democracies. These include adherence to the duties and responsibilities of public office, as well as the norms regulating voting and the party system. Civil organizations, alongside the political class, must take responsibility for safeguarding these principles to prevent populism from taking root within their ranks and political entities. As Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt remind us in “How Democracies Die”, more essentialist forms of democracy—with demagogic speeches and leaders, populist organizations, plebiscitary practices, and Caesarism—civil institutions see a reduction in their mediating and arbitrating capacity for the multiplicity of material and ideal interests, hindering the expression of civil solidarity. The leader, party, or movement positions itself as the voice of the people, appealing to collective identities exclusively articulated in a binary key of belonging.

Illiberalism in its most extreme forms, especially when it seizes power, thrives by co-opting civil institutions and intermediate spaces. In addition, it silences or sidelines those who articulate alternative positions to its political project. This is achieved by subverting the law and discrediting dissenting voices often through the civil exclusion of discordant voices. If the ultimate expression of this idealized political project successfully materializes in a specific place and time, it opens the door for an anti-democratic populist project to crystallize. Some recent examples include traits of this ideal definition of illiberal scenarios: the leadership of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Law and Justice in Poland, the Brexit referendum in 2016, the declaration of independence in Catalonia in 2017, and the Trump administration in the USA. Sadly, a progressive and accelerated trend of democratic degradation may be observed in Spain as 2023 ends, following the formation of a new coalition government led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) with the support of left-wing populist, nationalist, and separatist forces.

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Beyond the Digital Markets Act: much more than a piece of legislation

Inês Neves (Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Porto | Researcher at CIJ - Centre for Legal Research | Member of the Jean Monnet Module team DigEUCit - A Digital Europe for Citizens. Constitutional and policymaking challenges) and Luísa Amaro de Matos (LL.M. in European Legal Studies – College of Europe, Bruges)
           

On 6 September 2023, the European Commission (‘EC’) designated a first set of six gatekeepers in relation to 22 core platform services(‘CPS’)[1]. These undertakings must ensure compliance with the positive and negative obligations set out in the Digital Markets Act (‘DMA’)[2] by March 2024.[3]

Meanwhile, the DMA is already having an impact, with Facebook and Instagram, for instance, offering European users ‘the choice’ to pay a monthly subscription to use their social networks without any advertising (ads).[4]

On 17 November 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) confirmed that Apple, Bytedance and Meta had brought actions challenging the designation of (some of) their core platform services,[5] namely Titktok as regards Bytedance (T-1077/23); Facebook Marketplace and Messenger concerning Meta (T-1078/23), and App Store and iMessage for Apple (Cases T-1079/23 & T-1080/23).

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The need for an egalitarian ethical framework for emerging technologies

Manuel Protásio (PhD Candidate at the School of Law of the University of Minho. FCT research scholarship holder – Bolsa UI/BD/152801/2022) 
           

The blurring boundary between humans and machines introduces a crucial dichotomy between consciousness and information, shaping the dynamics of our technological engagement and the “limbo” between humans and technologies, situated around perception, is central to how the law assesses its potential effects on human behaviour.

According to Kantian philosophy, the act of perception is a private, subjective, and observer-dependent mechanism, which, by its nature, grants the subject a sensation of agency over the physical reality – their environment. This feeling of agency can be understood as the empowering subjective experience that is often translated into the individual’s freedom and autonomy. If it is true that the synthetical perception confers agency over the perceived objects as they are read into our reality, it must also be true that illusions – reasoning mistakes based on our perception – can be triggered if our perception follows systematic errors that occur whenever we store wrong information about our reality regarding perceived objects, or when we use the wrong model of perception to interpret the external world.[1] 

What technologies like Augmented Reality (AR) or Artificial Intelligence (AI) will cause to our perception in the short and long-term is to convey analytical information from the physical world and thus trigger potential changes in our synthetical perception, which can lead to the loss of agency of our own our reality. Virtual Reality (VR), on the other hand, can trigger the same effect by deceiving the synthetical sensory feedback of our biological perception and replicating it through technological means.   

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Disinformation overload on social networks: is the European “marketplace of ideas” threatening to collapse

Iolanda Rodrigues de Brito  (PhD, Lecturer at the Ius Gentium  Conimbrigae – Human Rights Centre)
           

Disinformation about the Israel-Hamas conflict is flooding social networks, creating an increased risk of escalating the war.[1] Over the past few weeks, the European Commission has rushed to urge social media platforms to comply with the Digital Services Act (DSA), which came into force on 16 November 2022.[2] According to the European Commission, the DSA “sets out an unprecedented new standard for the accountability of online platforms regarding disinformation, illegal content, such as illegal hate speech, and other societal risks” and it “includes overarching principles and robust guarantees for freedom of expression and other users’ rights”.[3] 

On 25 April 2023, the Commission had designated 19 very large online platforms and very large online search engines on the ground of their number of users being above 45 million or 10% of the European Union (EU) population. These services need to comply with the full set of provisions introduced by the DSA since the end of August 2023.[4] Although the new regulation will only be generally applicable from 17 February 2024, its applicability has been anticipated in relation to very large online search engines and very large online platforms, such as social networks (article 92 of the DSA).

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EU’s policies to AI: are there blindspots regarding accountability and democratic governance?

Maria Inês Costa (PhD Candidate at the School of Law of the University of Minho. FCT research scholarship holder – UI/BD/154522/2023) 
           

In her recent State of the Union (SOTEU) 2023 speech, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen addressed several pressing issues, including artificial intelligence (AI). In this regard, the President of the European Commission highlighted that leading AI creators, academics and experts have issued a warning about AI, stressing that “mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war”, adding that AI is advancing at a faster pace than its creators predicted.[1]

The President of the European Commission also argued that of the three pillars of the global framework for AI – guardrails, governance, and guiding innovation – guardrails is the most important, and in this sense, AI must be developed in a way that is human-centred, transparent, and accountable. Indeed, in Europe we have witnessed such an approach to the development of AI, as evidenced by various official documents and reports from different scientific communities, [2] also emphasising the need to build trust in this type of technology.

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Why is the demarcation of indigenous peoples’ territories in Brazil important to achieve European and global climate goals?

Cecília Bojarski Pires  (PhD Candidate at the School of Law of the University of Minho) 
           

Indigenous and tribal peoples’[1] ancestral territories are essential for climate stability and resilience.[2] “Their territories contain about one-third of all the carbon stored in Latin America and the Caribbean forests and 14 percent of the carbon stored in tropical forests worldwide”.[3] It is indisputable that the role played by indigenous peoples is vital in terms of global climate action, but that is not all. This article aims to demonstrate the importance of preserving indigenous peoples’ lands to achieve European and global climate goals, protect the forests and other ecosystems, conserve biodiversity, and prevent climate change. Furthermore, it is a matter of respect for human rights, a European value.

According to Villares,[4] indigenous peoples are united to the land and all its elements. Moreover, the land is not just a tangible material element but a subjective element that takes on a transcendental character. Thus, the territory is occupied and developed by everyone in that community. For that reason, indigenous peoples’ production system is, in general, much less predatory. The consequence of this special way of dealing with the land means that indigenous peoples can use natural resources without putting ecosystems at risk. It makes them indispensable for guaranteeing environmental conservation and contributing to the fight against poverty, hunger, and malnutrition.[5]

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The Nature Restoration Law in the European Parliament

Isabel Estrada Carvalhais (MEP | Full Member of the Committee of Agriculture and Rural Development and of the Committee of Fisheries | Member of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of the Socialists and Democrats) 
           

Introduction[1]

This is not an article with academic purposes and even its modest informative and reflective intent is far from complete. Its main aim is to contribute to further information and reflection on a quite important topic presently on top of the European political agenda: the Nature Restoration Law.

I suggest we look at the European Commission’s (EC) proposal for a regulation on the restoration of nature (hereinafter referred to as the Nature Restoration Act or NRL), at the on-going negotiation process in the European Parliament (EP) with recent votes in two associated committees (the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development and the Committee on Fisheries) and in the EP leading committee (Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety).               

Let us start from the beginning and the beginning is not in the EC proposal itself, but a bit further back, in the conclusions of the European Council of 20 June 2019, immediately after the European elections of 26 May.

The conclusions provided (and still do) a clear preview of the key priorities for action in the European political agenda, as understood by the heads of state and government of the 27 Member States. It is important here to make this reference especially in a social context where we tend to ignore (or are instrumentally led to ignore) the active role that our states and our rulers play in the design of the European project. Chapter III of the conclusions of the European Council[2] reads as follows: The European Council underlines the importance of the Climate Action Summit that the UN Secretary-General will organise in September 2019 to strengthen global climate action in order to achieve the objective of the Paris Agreement, including by pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, and welcomes the active participation of Member States and the Commission in the preparations.”

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Once again on the rule of law in Romania. The risk that thousands of defendants would not face criminal liability: a new wave of requests preliminary rulings at the CJEU

Dragoș Călin (Judge at the Bucharest Court of Appeal and Co-President of the Romanian Judges' Forum Association) 
           

The decisions of the Constitutional Court of Romania once again created a wave of requests for preliminary rulings at the CJEU. Currently there are ten such new referrals that the ordinary courts in Romania (Brașov Court of Appeal, Bucharest Court of Appeal, Bistrița First Instance Court) have submitted or are going to submit after drafting the decisions,[1] under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In fact, one of the requests (case C-107/23 PPU, Lin) will be heard in an urgent preliminary ruling procedure, therefore, in a very short time, a solution is expected from the CJEU, as the pleadings are scheduled for 10 May 2023. Another reference for a preliminary ruling was dismissed in a peculiar manner, as a result of the admission by the High Court of Cassation and Justice – Criminal Division of the request to transfer the hearing of the case, the High Court noting the fear of a defendant, judged in several cases in which he has such a capacity, regarding the referral to the CJEU.

In the domestic cases in which these requests were submitted, the accused requested the application of the principle of the most favorable criminal law (lex mitior) in the situation where a decision of the Constitutional Court of Romania declared unconstitutional a legal provision (Article 155 par. (1) of the Romanian Criminal Code) regarding the interruption of the limitation period of criminal liability (Decision no. 358/2022). To do so, the Constitutional Court argued the passivity of the legislator, which did not intervene to bring the legal text into agreement with another decision of the Constitutional Court, issued four years earlier (Decision no. 297/2018). During that time the case law of the common courts formed and attempted to interpret the existing in law in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s decision, the practical consequence of reducing to half the limitation period for all criminal acts for which a final judgment of conviction was not issued prior to the first decision of the Constitutional Court and of terminating the criminal proceedings against the accused in question.

Continue reading “Once again on the rule of law in Romania. The risk that thousands of defendants would not face criminal liability: a new wave of requests preliminary rulings at the CJEU”