Ana Cardoso (PhD candidate & Master’s in European Union Law at the School of Law of University of Minho. FCT research scholarship holder – 2025.06747.BD.)

I.

On March 23, 2026 the European Commission took the final procedural step required for provisional application of the EU-Mercosur interim Trade Agreement (“iTA”), by notifying the Mercosur countries with a “note verbale”.[1] This means that as of May 1, 2026, the iTA has started being provisionally applied, despite the European Parliament’s decision to ask for the European Court of Justice’s (“CJEU”) opinion on whether the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement (“EMTA”) is in conformity with the Treaties.[2]

This was possible because the EMTA is divided into two main documents: (i) the iTA covering trade liberalisation and (ii) a broader comprehensive Partnership Agreement; the first can take effect while the second faces the hurdles of full ratification.[3]

Given this somewhat unprecedented decision by the Commission – which ignores a long-standing gentleman’s agreement of institutional respect between the Commission and the Parliament – it is worth questioning if this provisional application might end up jeopardising the EU’s ambitious climate and environmental goals or if, on the other hand, the internal legal framework in this area is strong enough to prevent indirect backtracking.

The relevance of this question is two-fold: firstly, the provisional application of the iTA means that the relationship established by the EMTA between the EU and Mercosur countries will be temporarily circumscribed to commercial matters, and the more ambitious value-driven dispositions of the Partnership Agreement – which cover climate and environmental matters – are on stand-by pending the CJEU’s pronouncement, and subsequent process of ratification. Secondly, the geopolitical context in which we now live, has pushed the EU to take steps towards simplification and deregulation[4] in the name of competitiveness and growth, meaning protection can end up reduced, and environmental impacts not accounted for or safeguarded by the EU’s environmental legal framework, which, although ambitious, is currently in a state of transition.

II.

With the adoption of the European Green Deal (“EGD”) – built on the constitutional basis of the current Article 11 TFEU[5] –, the EU has positioned itself at the forefront of the inclusion of environmental concerns in all its action. From internal legislative initiatives to international agreements with third parties, ponderation must be given as to how a certain action is in accordance with the EU’s climate goals and environmental concerns and initiatives.[6] The European Climate Law (“ECL”)[7] entered into force in July 2021, functioning as a constitutionally required guiding law which defines the ambitious climate targets of the EU and ensures compliance.^[8]

That being said, successful implementation of the EGD has been dependent on three key regulations, which have now been significantly impaired by the Commission’s “simplification” efforts through the Omnibus Packages.[9] Those are: the Directive on corporate sustainability reporting (“CSRD”),[10] the EU Taxonomy Regulation,[11] and the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence (“CSDDD”).[12] With the Omnibus I Regulation[13] minimum requirements have been broadened to allow companies increased freedom, which hopefully will mean more investment, innovation and growth. But, on the other hand, sustainability requirements seem to have been sidelined.[14] Thus, the argument that the stringent rules within the EU – coupled with the Chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development of the EMTA – could curve the dangers of the Agreement, as reasoned by the Commission[15] when it comes to environmental protection and sustainability safeguards,[16] can fall.

The top goods the EU imports from Mercosur are agricultural products, mineral products, and pulp and paper, with imports growing by over 50%, between 2014 and 2024, and expected to leap significantly from now on.[17] Additionally, Brazil has the second-largest rare earth reserves on the planet, with roughly 21 million tons, and is the source of more than 90% of global niobium output – essential to aerospace and advanced steel manufacturing.[18]

These products can have deep environmental and health impacts when it comes to their extraction. The philosopher Byung-Chul Han, writing on the need for a planetary consciousness, points out that it “is regrettable that the land is so brutally exploited today”. The fight for the control of rare earth elements (“REEs”) is an example of how society has “lost all sensitivity to the earth”, only thinking of “it as a source of resources that, at best, must be treated sustainably”.[19]

Still, the Commission maintains that the EMTA upholds the very stringent and non-negotiable standards on food safety, and human, animal and plant health. Any product sold in the EU – be it domestically produced or imported –, must comply with the EU’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (“SPS”), which remain unchanged regardless of trade agreements concluded by the EU, such as the case of the EMTA.

It is reasoned that to enforce effective compliance with the SPS requirements and other EU market rules, the Union has a robust import system based on science, risk assessments, audits to third countries, border controls, and controls in the EU market, which has at its base the precautionary principle. Further, a reinforcement of measures was announced to strengthen controls on imported food, animal and plant products.[20]

Plus, on 18 July 2024, the Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for sustainable products (“ESPR”)[21] entered into force, aiming to significantly improve the circularity, energy performance and other environmental sustainability aspects of products placed on the EU market.[22]

The ESPR can cover virtually all physical products, only a few exemptions apply. However, these exemptions – food and feed, medicinal products (Article 1), and the non-address of defence and national security-related products of non-dual use [Article 5(5)] – can mean that a significantly large part of Mercosur imports are not covered by a regulation that aims to realise a large part of the EGD framework focused on the transition into a circular economy, a crucial step towards reducing the pressure on natural resources, halting biodiversity loss, achieving climate neutrality by 2050, and building a more resilient and competitive Europe. According to numbers presented by the European Commission, resource extraction and processing causes 90% of biodiversity loss.[23]

In its Chapter III, the ESPR, also establishes the Digital Product Passport (“DPP”), which is a digital identity card for products, components, and materials, which will store relevant information to support products’ sustainability, promote their circularity and strengthen legal compliance. The information included in the DPP will depend on the nature of the specific product, but can include the following: the product’s technical performance, its materials and their origins, repair activities, recycling capabilities, and lifecycle environmental impacts.[24] Still, this seemingly crucial instrument has some shortcomings which can impact its effective use: namely, when it comes to complex products, whose raw materials and components can be difficult to fully track, and the types of products excluded.

The issue of deforestation is inevitable when it comes to discussions of the EMTA. As of the end of this year, only deforestation-free products will be allowed to enter the EU market^[25] – including soya bean, beef, palm oil, wood, cocoa, coffee, and rubber – and this will cover imports from the Mercosur region, ensuring that products imported under this deal have not contributed to deforestation.[26]

However, as covered in a 2025 article in this publication,[27] the EMTA can create a potential increase in deforestation in the Amazon by 25%,^[28] with increased bilateral trade, in addition to the requirement for a deforestation-free supply chain, likely leading to a sizable “indirect deforestation” phenomenon in the Mercosur region. Meaning that agricultural land used for different markets can be displaced or exchanged. For example, soya bean production in Brazil destined for the EU must comply with deforestation-free requirements, while production areas for export to other third-party markets or for domestic consumption can be in recently deforested locations.[29]

Another issue has to do with what products are not covered by these anti-deforestation rules – such as the case of corn –, and that also fall through the cracks of other European sustainability and environmental regulations and directives, meaning they become a category above worry and outside the legal frameworks that aim to protect the climate and the environment, and ensure sustainability.

III.

As seen before, import controls should not be affected by the EMTA or by the provisional application of the iTA. As such they include: (i) audits and approval of the official control systems of the competent authorities of the third countries interested in exporting to the EU; (ii) control of documents, identity checks (commodities’ identification marks, stamps and other necessary product or package information) and physical checks (taking a sample of the product to look for pathogenic microorganisms or illegal contaminants; checks of the means of transport and fitness of the animals being transported) carried out at the EU borders by national authorities; (iii) meat imported into the EU must come from animals that were slaughtered or killed under animal welfare conditions equivalent to those of the EU; (iv) sampling of products already at sale in the EU market (originating in the EU or imported).[30]

But questions must be raised on several points. Firstly, how can the EU guarantee the proper approval of control systems when it so often relies on reports and documents of third countries, trusting in what potential partners are alleging without full “boots-on-the-ground” checking and oversight?[31]

Secondly, criticism has been levied against national border authorities when it comes to their capability to thoroughly check imports and ensure their compliance.[32] With a significant increase in imports from the Mercosur region, their abilities are further brought into question. Of course, this can be helped through the control and tracking mechanisms the Mercosur region is instituting in their jurisdiction, such as the Selo Verde in Brazil,[33] and the electronic traceability system for cattle, buffalo, and deer in Argentina.[34] But this does not work if real and effective reinforcement of measures to strengthen controls on imports are not fully realised.

Another question has to do with the DPP: is it effective when it comes to complex products, especially those which are produced with a variety of raw materials from different regions and varied modes of production?

If we take the example of the textile and footwear industry, the complexity and fragmentation of the textile supply chain, which encompasses numerous stakeholders, from raw material suppliers to manufacturers and retailers, makes collecting and verifying the data necessary for DPPs a potentially difficult task. Furthermore, many textile and footwear products are composed of a mixture of materials, each with its own environmental characteristics and lifecycle considerations. Ensuring accurate and comprehensive data for these complex products represents a major challenge for both companies and regulators.[35] To overcome this difficulty the EU created the Product Environmental Footprint method (“PEF”), which provides rules to quantify and communicate environmental impacts of products, focusing on reducing impacts throughout the supply chain;[36] still, many complex products are either excluded or still do not have PEF guidelines.

Additionally, how do we overcome the challenge that the DPP – basically the only tracking method in such a complex market that offers some degree of reliability by taking advantage of data technology –, does not cover food, animal feed, medicinal products, and products relating to national security? Will traditional oversight methods be sufficient to ensure that products imported from the Mercosur region are not creating deep environmental impacts for both blocs?

Green technology is seen as one of the best options for decarbonisation, however its production requires REEs, the extraction of which releases toxic chemicals into the environment, contaminating groundwater and even entire waterways. It also produces high amounts of toxic waste – for every ton of rare earth, 2,000 tons of toxic waste are produced –, with high risk of environmental and health hazards, damaging communities and contaminating surrounding areas.[37]

Can REEs be out of the scope of the DPP if argued their commercialisation is a matter of national security like the United States of America do? If so, how can the EU guarantee that the exploration of REEs imported into the EU market is sustainable and does not create an environmental “disaster” in the Mercosur region, specifically Brazil?

These issues are highly complex. Going back to Han, when writing on the commodification of values, he argued that they can serve as “things for individual consumption”, becoming commodities. “Values such as justice, humanity or sustainability are exploited for profit. (…) Moral values are consumed as marks of distinction. They are credited to the ego-account, appreciating the value of self. They increase our narcissistic self-respect. Through values we relate not to community but to our own egos.”[38]

The EU has a self-imposed obligation of not letting its values, namely those relating to climate and environmental protection be commodified; a sort of virtue signalling to the rest of the world which becomes a credit to its own collective ego as a “green” Europe, while letting its commercial interests and its desires to increase competitiveness and growth effectively jeopardise its long history of environmental protection and the objectives set forth by the EGD and the constitutional treaties.

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[1] European Commission, “Daily News – EU-Mercosur Agreement to provisionally apply from 1 May 2026”, Brussels, March 23, 2026, accessed March 23, 2026, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_26_681.

[2] European Parliament, “EU-Mercosur: MEPs demand a legal opinion on its conformity with the EU treaties”, Press Release, January 21, 2026, accessed March 23, 2026, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260116IPR32450/eu-mercosur-meps-demand-a-legal-opinion-on-its-conformity-with-the-eu-treaties.

[3] European Commission, “EU-Mercosur agreement”, accessed March 23, 2026, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement_en.

[4] There are different opinions when it comes to the classification of what the Commission is trying to do, if it is in fact a matter of “simplification” – as initially announced –, or if it is truly an exercise in “deregulation”. Simplification would imply carefully cataloguing and assessing current regulations, evaluating the rationale behind those deemed too restrictive, and then proceeding to a correcting alteration with due safeguarding. This does not seem to be the case, as the Omnibus packages seem to be generally lowering thresholds for oversight to allow companies to move more freely in the market and incentivise investment. See Phuc-Vinh Nguyen, “Green Deal: towards a massive regulatory pause?”, Institut Jacques Delors, February 12, 2025, accessed March 23, 2026, https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/green-deal-towards-a-massive-regulatory-pause/.

[5] Article 11 of the TFEU prescribes the following: “Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”.

[6] European Commission, “The European Green Deal – Striving to be the first climate-neutral continent”, accessed March 23, 2026, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en.

[7] European Commission, “European Climate Law”, accessed March 23, 2026, https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/european-climate-law_en.

[8] Christian Calliess, “The Future of the European Green Deal”, Verfassungsblog, September 12, 2024, accessed March 23, 2026, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-future-of-the-european-green-deal/.

[9] The Omnibus Packages are an ongoing series of legislative proposals which aim to reduce administrative burdens, to cut red tape, and to simplify sustainability reporting for businesses, by modifying key regulations like the CSRD, CSDDD, and Taxonomy Regulation, limiting the scope of companies required to report and delaying implementation deadlines. See European Commission, “Omnibus package”, April 1, 2026, accessed April 14, 2026, https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/omnibus-package-2025-04-01_en.

[10] European Commission, “Corporate sustainability reporting”, December 9, 2025, accessed March 23, 2026, https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/corporate-sustainability-reporting_en#legislation.

[11] European Commission, “EU taxonomy for sustainable activities”, December 17, 2025, accessed March 23, 2026, https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en.

[12] European Commission, “Corporate sustainability due diligence”, accessed March 23, 2026, https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/doing-business-eu/sustainability-due-diligence-responsible-business/corporate-sustainability-due-diligence_en.

[13] European Commission, “Omnibus I”, February 26, 2025, accessed March 23, 2026, https://commission.europa.eu/publications/omnibus-i_en.

[14] Apostolos Thomadakis, “The EU’s sustainability rollback is a retreat disguised as simplification”, CEPS, February 27, 2025, accessed March 23, 2026, https://www.ceps.eu/the-eus-sustainability-rollback-is-a-retreat-disguised-as-simplification/.

[15] . James Harrison and Sophia Paulini, “Reinventing trade, environment and development interlinkages: lessons from the EU–Mercosur Association Agreement”, Journal of International Economic Law (2024): 5, accessed March 23, 2026, doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgae044.

[16] Ana Cardoso, “The European Union’s climate diplomacy – trade as a path towards climate neutrality”, UNIO – EU Law Journal, v. 11, no. 1 (June 2025): 4-20, doi: 10.21814/unio.11.1.6633.

[17] European Council, Council of the European Union, “EU-Mercosur trade: facts and figures”, February 17, 2026, accessed April 14, 2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-mercosur-trade/.

[18] Fernanda Magnotta, “Can Brazil and the U.S. Reach a Deal on Rare Earths?”, Americas Quarterly, December 9, 2025, accessed April 14, 2026, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/can-brazil-and-the-u-s-reach-a-deal-on-rare-earths/.

[19] Byung-Chul Han, In Praise of the Earth: A Journey into the Garden, E-Book (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 19-20.

[20] European Commission, “Factsheet: EU-Mercosur partnership agreement – Respecting Europe’s health and safety standards”, accessed April 08, 2026, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/factsheet-eu-mercosur-partnership-agreement-respecting-europes-health-and-safety-standards_en.

[21] Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for sustainable products, amending Directive (EU) 2020/1828 and Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 and repealing Directive 2009/125/EC (Text with EEA relevance), accessed, April 08, 2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1781/2024-06-28.

[22] EUR-Lex, “Ecodesign requirements for sustainable products”, Summaries of EU Legislation, October 15, 2024,, accessed April 08, 2026, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/ecodesign-requirements-for-sustainable-products.html.

[23] European Commission, “Circular Economy”, accessed April 08, 2026, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy_en.

[24] European Commission, “Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation”, accessed April 08, 2026, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy/ecodesign-sustainable-products-regulation_en.

[25] See Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010.

[26] European Commission, “Factsheet: EU-Mercosur partnership agreement – Opening opportunities for European farmers”, accessed, April 14, 2026, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/factsheet-eu-mercosur-partnership-agreement-opening-opportunities-european-farmers_en.

[27] Cardoso, “The European”, 18.

[28] Paola Nano, “EU-Mercosur Trade Deal: Concerns from the EU Slow Food Network”, Slow Food, December 04, 2024, accessed April 14, 2026, https://www.slowfood.com/blog-and-news/eu-mercosur-concerns-from-eu-slow-food-network/.

[29] Susan E.M. Cesar de Oliveira et al., “The European Union-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement as a tool for

environmentally sustainable land use governance”, Environmental Science and Policy, v. 161 (2024): 3, accessed January 24, 2025, doi: 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103875.

[30] European Commission, “Factsheet: EU-Mercosur partnership agreement – Respecting Europe’s health and safety standards”, accessed April 08, 2026, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/factsheet-eu-mercosur-partnership-agreement-respecting-europes-health-and-safety-standards_en.

[31] EuroCommerce, “EuroCommerce Position on the Market Surveillance Regulation”, February 05, 2026, accessed April 14, 2026,  https://www.eurocommerce.eu/2026/02/eurocommerce-position-on-the-market-surveillance-regulation/.

[32] Carmen Martínez San Millán, “Finally, Mercosur!… Or not? The stumbling block with the chapter on trade and sustainable development”, EJIL:Talk! – Blog of the European Journal of International Law, February 06, 2026, accessed April 14, 2026, https://www.ejiltalk.org/finally-mercosur-or-not-the-stumbling-block-with-the-chapter-on-trade-and-sustainable-development/.

[33] See Decreto nº 12.063, de 17 de Junho de 2024 que Institui o Programa Selo Verde Brasil, Diário Oficial da União, June 18, 2024, ed. 115, section 1, 5, accessed April 08, 2026, https://pesquisa.in.gov.br/imprensa/jsp/visualiza/index.jsp?data=18/06/2024&jornal=515&pagina=5. Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços, “Programa Selo Verde Brasil”, gov.br, October 23, 2023, accessed April 08, 2026, https://www.gov.br/participamaisbrasil/programa-selo-verde-brasil.

[34] Elagro, “Argentina will gradually implement electronic traceability from 2025”, Tridge, Actober 18, 2024, accessed April 14, 2026, https://www.tridge.com/news/argentina-will-gradually-implement-electroni-ttkiah.

[35] NITextile, “Passaporte Digital do Produto: Uma Ferramenta de Decisão”, NIT, n.d., accessed April 08, 2026, https://nitextile.pt/?p=1350.

[36] European Commission, “Product Environmental Footprint method – Understanding key concepts and how to implement them”, accessed April 08, 2026, https://green-forum.ec.europa.eu/green-business/environmental-footprint-methods/pef-method_en.

[37] Jaya Nayar, “Not So ‘Green’ Technology: The Complicated Legacy of Rare Earth Mining”, Harvard International Review, August 12, 2021, accessed April 14, 2026, https://hir.harvard.edu/not-so-green-technology-the-complicated-legacy-of-rare-earth-mining/.

[38] Byung-Chul Han, The Disappearance of Rituals: A Topology of the Present (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020), 5.

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Picture credit: by Yasemin Sessiz on pexels.com.