Ana Cardoso [PhD candidate & Master’s in European Union Law at the School of Law of University of Minho. FCT research scholarship holder – 2025.06747.BD. DOI: https://doi.org/10.54499/2025.06747.BD.]
I.
The Critical Raw Materials Act (“CRMA”) aims to give a comprehensive response to the challenges of ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of the indispensable materials that are at the basis of the 2030 and 2050 objectives of the ecological and digital transitions; these are essential for the European Union’s (“EU”) economy and a wide set of necessary technologies for strategic sectors such as renewable energy, and the digital, aerospace and defence sectors.[1]
Within the recent push towards making its economy more independent and strategically relevant, the EU approved a number of projects with recognised strategic importance, the proposed Savannah Lithium Barroso Mine in the Trás-os-Montes region of northern Portugal being one of them.[2] Additionally, the European Commission has launched a large deregulation effort in the form of the Omnibus Packages in order to encourage investment and facilitate the activity of private actors in sectors that push forth the ambitious objectives of a technologically advanced and climate-neutral economy.[3] A push that has mostly relegated issues relating to climate, the environment, and the European Green Deal (“EGD”), into obscurity.[4]
Nevertheless, there is hope to be found, as the Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen dedicated part of her recent State of the European Union (“SOTEU 2026”) address to the issue of climate change. Recognising that “[s]cience is clear. Europe is warming at double the global rate. Of course, the transition is complex. And we will need to adjust and learn along the way. But there is no doubt: Europe can, must and will stay the course on its climate targets”. Still, focus heavily leaned towards resilience and preparedness aiming to “make Europe the champion in adaptation technologies – a huge emerging market”,[5] and not so much on the EGD and its early ambitious initiatives.
As Arthur Snell points out in his book “Elemental: the new geography of climate change and how we survive it”, the “critical-minerals story is a part of a bigger transition of global power”[6] and, to put it very simply, “without critical raw materials, there will be no Green Deal”[7], no ecological transition. As such, it is worth discussing how the EU is planning to keep its place as a relevant global actor, while at the same time not forgetting the costs that its decisions might have on the populations and environment of the places that will fuel this two-pronged transition.
II.
The CRMA – or Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of 11 April 2024 – aims to be a comprehensive response to the challenges of sourcing critical raw materials by strengthening the European value chain and ensuring a diversification of the EU’s imports by reducing strategic dependencies, improving the EU’s capacity to monitor and mitigate risks and the circularity and sustainability of this critical market.
The crux of the issue, when it comes to critical raw materials, is in the fact that they are of high economic importance, especially in decarbonisation economies, but highly vulnerable to supply disruptions, due to the concentration of their supply in third countries.
In the EU only – an economy highly reliant on these imports –, the demand is expected to increase seven-fold for rare earth metals and twenty-fold for lithium by 2050. Recent crises, like the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the politico-economic instability caused by the second Trump administration, have underlined how impactful the EU’s strategic dependencies are for the internal market.[8]
The risk here was that uncoordinated actions by Member States acting independently could not only be insufficient to effectively prevent supply disruptions and regulate what is a highly environmentally impactful industry, but they also could distort competition and cause the fragmentation of the internal market, through the imposition of diverging regulation, granting access to supply risk monitoring at different levels, offering diverging levels of support for national projects, or by creating obstacles to cross-border trade.[9] Therefore, joint and timely action and a strengthening of the single market by focusing on the resilience and competitiveness of European industries was needed, at the risk of the EU’s ecological and digital objectives,[10] hence the approval of the CRMA.
When it comes to lithium deposits, they are not a rarity; they are relatively widespread around the world. Within the European territory there are some significant reserves, and in its path to independence the EU is trying to ensure that by 2030 at least 10% of its critical raw materials are produced in the continent, lithium is a part of this.[11]
Although EU regulations aim to limit overdependence on third countries, reaching production targets has proved particularly challenging, mostly due to the fact that Europe is a continent of small and densely populated countries, it is unlikely that a mining project will be located far away enough from populations not to face strong social and political opposition.[12] Examples of this phenomenon are: the project in Serbia – which at full potential would be Europe’s largest lithium mine – that has suffered repeated postponements and is at the basis of widespread protests, not just against the project but against the country’s government and its alleged corruption;[13] and the Barroso lithium mine in northern Portugal, which, as covered below, after multiple challenges getting off the ground is likely to become an expensive producer, raising questions regarding its competitiveness.[14]
The CRMA was accompanied by a communication that outlined how the EU intends to strengthen global engagement with reliable partners through mutually beneficial partnerships in a bid to develop and diversify investment, production, and trade, with a view to promoting these partners’ “own economic development in a sustainable manner while also creating secure, resilient, affordable and sufficiently diversified value chains for the EU”;[15] meaning this has also become a focus of the European commercial policy and its commercial agreements.
However, two relevant questions come to the forefront: will the EU’s industry pay the prices of internally produced – or produced in a third party-country under the auspices of a partnership agreement with the EU –, raw materials just because they originate in “friendly territory”? Or will it continue buying from perhaps less regulated third-party markets in a bid to make the final product, created in the EU, competitive on the world stage?[16]
III.
The Savannah Lithium Barroso Mine will mean the biggest industrial investment in Portugal since Autoeuropa, three decades ago,[17] and has been qualified as “strategic” by the European Commission, a status that effectively fast-tracks its development, by “providing faster permitting, improved access to financing, and reduced administrative burden”.[18]
With exploration to start in 2028, this has been a somewhat controversial project; expected to be one of the biggest open-pit mines in Europe, it stands less than 2 kilometres away from seven villages, one of which stands a mere 200 metres away from its safety perimeter.[19]
The independent monitoring network MiningWatch Portugal considers the Barroso Mine qualification as a way to “justify environmental degradation and harm to local communities, while overlooking lithium’s uncertain economics”, since a lithium value chain is not yet secure in Portugal or within the EU, as most projects are still in an embryonic stage.Despite requests by environmental organisations and local civil society groups to go back on their decision, the European Commission rejected them, arguing that under the CRMA “verifying full compliance with EU environmental law and that associated issues, from water scarcity to biodiversity and tailings safety, are Portugal’s responsibility”[20] and not the Commission’s.
This conjecture led Associação Unidos em Defesa de Covas do Barroso and ClientEarth to file a case at the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), alleging that the European Commission failed to take into account new evidence of the project’s environmental, social and safety risks. They ask the Court to not only annul the decision, but also clarify the Commission’s obligations under the CRMA.[21]
A study done by Steven H. Emerman found that the project’s proposal did not “recognize that the embankment of waste rock that would surround the filtered tailings constitutes a dam” and that there was “no consideration of the consequences of dam failure, although the most-likely scenario will be a release of 8.5 million cubic meters of mine waste with a runout distance of 86 kilometres, affecting numerous communities along the Tâmega and Douro Rivers”. Meaning that in the likely scenario of dam failure, the populations living around the Tâmega River will suffer deep environmental consequences, with local water tables dropping, dealing with a high risk of leakage of toxic processing chemicals into the surrounding ecosystems, which will threaten human communities and regional biodiversity; with the worst-case scenario projecting that mine waste could end up in the Porto Metropolitan Area and then the Atlantic Ocean.[22]
Hence, the mine’s potential impacts directly engage the protections of the Water Framework Directive – or Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy –, that originally enshrined a non-deterioration principle which meant that a project could not proceed if it posed a risk of worsening the status of rivers or groundwater.[23] However, this Directive was reviewed under the EU’s deregulation push, which means that from 11 May 2026 this principle can be more flexibly applied in order to “facilitate important economic activities”.[24]
In a TV report conducted by the Portuguese national channel, RTP, Savannah Resources’ CEO and its exploration manager argued that the environmental impacts of the mine would be fairly insignificant, and that all measures were being taken to guarantee that detritus from the mine would not leak and contaminate the ecosystem, as well as to prevent noise pollution and the perturbation of the local waterways.[25] The environmental impact study, submitted in May 2020 and redesigned and resubmitted in 2023,[26] found that the project could be one of low impact and that it minimised disturbances to the environment.[27]
However, the previously cited study by Emerman found the project for the tailings storage and waste mound of the Barroso Mine as an example of “reckless creativity”, as it is mostly built upon a previously untested hypothesis which makes no consideration or action plan to the possibility of failure. The “Environmental Impact Study simply dismisses the possibility of failure by writing ‘the loss of human life is not expected, as the structural integrity and proper functioning of the waste facility are assured’ (…)”. [28] Further, using the word “assured” when referring to a situation highly dependent on unpredictable climatic and environmental conditions, and the use of an innovative engineering technique not built upon previous innovations, being therefore volatile, is reckless at best and highly dangerous at worst, making it sufficient for the rejection of the proposal. Despite this, the Portuguese Environmental Agency (“APA”) approved the project.[29]
It is not the first time governments and economic actors seem to prioritise economic development and production above human and environmental safety. The Chernobyl Power Plant was publicly considered safe before the disaster, which resulted from a combination of a series of factors – including defective reactor and shutdown system design, general disregard for safety and operating procedures, lack of administrative controls and independent regulatory oversight, excessive secrecy, etc. –, which led to the worst nuclear reactor accident in history.[30] In Aberfan, Wales the residents’ complaints about the mine’s waste mound were largely ignored, minimised, or dismissed by the National Coal Board and local authorities, resulting in the death of 144 people, including 116 children.[31]
It becomes difficult not to draw some comparisons between these disasters and the possible consequences of Savannah’s project to transform an inactive feldspar and quartz mining concession into four open-pit lithium mines, whose tailings storage is “assured” not to fail. A project that affects a large portion of the only recognised Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems Site (“GIAHS”) in Portugal.[32] In her SOTEU2026 speech, von der Leyen recognised “the risks of water scarcity for our farmers (…) For our industry – and for our food security. Crops need water to grow, while livestock need it to survive. Entire harvests depend on it”.[33] The ecological and digital transitions should not rely on shortcuts, which could compromise certain areas and, in a different – but perfectly possible – world, could be detrimental to our future food security. Instead, they should be based on the respect for the EU’s fundamental legal principles, science and justice.[34]
IV.
The Barroso region being a GIAHS means that the local communities live in an intricate relationship with the territory of this agro-ecosystem, which is characterised by “rich biodiversity, invaluable cultures and landscapes, sustainably managed by small-scale (pastoral) farmers”, and therefore the quality of the land, soil and water are of vital importance.[35]
The focus has been put on how economically and strategically beneficial this project will be to the region, the country, and the EU. Still, the social impacts of the ecological and digital transitions should not be ignored. A study by the Centre for Social Studies of the University of Coimbra found that the communities local to these large industrial and mining projects often report being (i) slowly dispossessed and marginalised; (ii) having their lives and livelihood considered disposable; (iii) being subjected to daily psychological and emotional damage; (iv) having proposed alternatives to development systematically disavowed; and (v) being disqualified as political subjects.[36]
Reporting reasons in line with these findings – which are strongly disputed by Savannah –, a group of around thirty people local to the Barroso Mine blocked machinery and workers from entering private and communal land to do prospective work with a view to studying the possibility of future enlargement of the mine; this work is possible due to an administrative easement given by the Portuguese Ministry of Environment which had previously been successfully suspended with an interim injunction filed by the Governing Board of the Communal Lands of the Parish of Covas do Barroso.[37]
Nevertheless, the study argues that this ends up creating “green sacrifice zones” where people and spaces are seen as “dispensable or ‘surplus’”, in the name of manufactured urgency which is deployed to justify fast‐tracking extractive projects which render traditional evaluation and conservation practices invisible and/or too flexible to reach the proposed objectives of ecological preservation.[38]
The demographic desertification of Trás-os-Montes, specifically, can be traced back to a lack of investment, taking away services, overlooking the need for infrastructure, and not giving enough support to the local agricultural sector.[39]Most large-scale projects in the Trás-os-Montes region fail, leaving the region empty once again, and often stripped of its natural resources. Such is the example of the Complexo Agroindustrial do Cachão in Mirandela which left a deserted village, thousands of unemployed, and an “industrial cemetery”,[40] or the Jales Mine the closing of which caused population and economic decline of a large region of the Vila Real district and later required an intervention of around 5.7 million euros for environmental recovery.[41]
Additionally, there are undeniable environmental concerns when it comes to the Barroso mining project. APA declared that the environmental impact study, after its 2023 review, complies with stringent environmental requirements. The approval of the project is subject to a broad set of measures to be complied with by Savannah, with a focus on protecting the Covas River – a tributary of the Tâmega River –, and the preservation of local fauna and flora. Still, the concerns related to the possible failing of the filtered tailings storage brought forth by Emerman’s study do not seem to be fully accounted for.[42]
As seen above, the Commission’s understanding is that the responsibility to fully evaluate the ecological impacts of a project like this belongs to Member States, despite its intersection with EU law. Therefore, it will be interesting to see what developments result from the CJEU’s response to the case brought by Associação Unidos em Defesa de Covas do Barroso and ClientEarth.
Projects like the Barroso lithium mine are important for the ecological and digital transitions to occur without leaving the EU in the fragile position of dependence on unreliable partners. As von der Leyen said during SOTEU2026: “This is not about mitigation or adaptation. We need both. And they need to strengthen each other. This is the only way to reach climate resilience”. [43] This transition does not occur in a vacuum, and there will be populations affected whose needs have to be recognised and accounted for. Our “future prosperity and security will greatly depend on how we manage the tipping points of our time”,[44] and therefore the EU’s resilience and competitiveness should not come at the cost of compromising on its core values.
[1] European Commission, “Critical Raw Materials Act”, accessed August 26, 2026, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en.
[2] Client Earth, “EU Commission doubles down on risky Barroso mine project – NGOs warn of new ‘sacrifice zone’”, Press Release, November 26, 2025, accessed August 26, 2026, https://www.clientearth.org/latest/press-office/press-releases/eu-commission-doubles-down-on-risky-barroso-mine-project-ngos-warn-of-new-sacrifice-zone/.
[3] European Commission, “Simplification”, accessed August 26, 2026, https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation/simplification-implementation-and-enforcement/simplification_en.
[4] Christian Calliess, “The future of the European Green Deal”, Verfassungsblog, September 12, 2024, accessed December 10, 2025, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-future-of-the-european-green-deal/.
[5] European Commission, “2026 State of the Union address by President von der Leyen”, Speech, September 16, 2026, accessed September 21, 2026, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_26_1868.
[6] Arthur Snell, Elemental: the new geography of climate change and how we survive it (London, Wildfire, 2026), 92.
[7] Snell, Elemental, 84.
[8] Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020, recitals 1 and 2. European Commission, “Critical Raw Materials Act”, accessed August 26, 2026, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en.
[9] Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020, recital 3.
[10] European Commission, “Critical Raw Materials Act”, accessed August 26, 2026, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en.
[11] European Commission, “Critical”.
[12] Snell, Elemental, 73.
[13] Rutger Sluijter, “The EU’s lithium dilemma in Serbia”, The Hague Research Institute, November 2025, accessed September 04, 2026, https://hagueresearch.org/the-eus-lithium-dilemma-in-serbia/.
[14] Snell, Elemental, 73.
[15] European Commission, “Critical Raw Materials Act”, accessed August 26, 2026, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en.
[16] Snell, Elemental, 73.
[17] Autoeuropa, “30 anos de uma história de sucesso em Portugal”, August 26, 2026, https://www.volkswagenautoeuropa.pt/volkswagen-autoeuropa-celebra-30-anos/.
[18] Earth.Org, “Environmental groups sue EU over controversial lithium mine in Portugal”. February 09, 2026, accessed August 26, 2026, https://earth.org/environmental-groups-sue-eu-over-controversial-lithium-mine-in-portugal/.
[19] Sandra Vindeirinho, “A febre do lítio”, Adília Godinho (coord.) Linha da Frente, July 26, 2026, 02:38-12:00, August 26, 2026, https://www.rtp.pt/play/p16136/e943020/linha-da-frente.
[20] Earth.Org, “Environmental”.
[21] Earth.Org, “Environmental”.
[22] Steven H. Emerman, “Evaluation of the tailings storage facility for the proposed Savannah lithium Barroso mine, northern Portugal”, June 29, 2021, 1 and 4, August 26, 2026, https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/frCommC186_15.10.2021_annex1.pdf.
[23] Hands Off Nature, “Case study | Covas do Barroso lithium mine”, March 03, 2026, accessed August 26, 2026, https://handsoffnature.eu/resource/case-study-covas-do-barroso-lithium-mine/.
[24] European Commission, “Water Framework Directive”, June 2026, accessed September 15, 2026, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/water-framework-directive_en.
[25] Vindeirinho, “A febre”, 25:16-27:23.
[26] Savannah Lithium Lda., “Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)”, accessed September 04, 2026,https://savannahresources.com/project/environmental-impact-assessment/.
[27] Dinheiro Vivo/Lusa, “Savannah entregou Estudo de Impacto Ambiental para mina de lítio no Barroso”, Diário de Notícias, July 01, 2020, accessed September 04, 2026, https://dinheirovivo.dn.pt/savannah-entregou-estudo-de-impacto-ambiental-para-mina-de-litio-no-barroso-12694801.html.
[28] Emerman, “Evaluation”, 34-36.
[29] Savannah, “Environmental”.
[30] Edwin Lyman, “Why is the US so anxious to unlearn the lessons of the Chernobyl disaster?”, The Equation, April 23, 2026, accessed September 15, 2026, https://blog.ucs.org/edwin-lyman/why-is-the-us-so-anxious-to-unlearn-the-lessons-of-the-chernobyl-disaster/. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Chernobyl accident – frequently asked questions”, accessed September 15, 2026, https://www.iaea.org/topics/chornobyl/faqs.
[31] Iain McLean, “Lessons from the Aberfan disaster and its aftermath”, British Academy Review, 12 (January 2009): 49-52, https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/publishing/review/12/lessons-aberfan-disaster-and-its-aftermath/. Huw Thomas and Tony Brown, “We survived the Aberfan disaster as schoolchildren, but were told to never talk about it again”, BBC, September 01, 2026, accessed September 15, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2zn9kdvxmo.
[32] EEB – European Environmental Bureau, “Lithium mining in Barroso, northern Portugal – critical factsheets on mining projects”, EU Raw Materials Coalition, March 04, 2025, accessed September 15, 2026, https://eurmc.org/publication/lithium-mining-in-barroso-northern-portugal-critical-factsheets-on-mining-projects/.
[33] European Commission, “2026 State of the Union”.
[34] Earth.Org, “Environmental”.
[35] EEB, “Lithium mining in Barroso”.
[36] Marcus Erridge et al., “Social impacts of the Green Transition: prospective environmental (in)justice in Europe’s peripheries”, Politics and Governance, 14 (2026): 2, 5 and 8-11.
[37] Lusa, “Lusa – Business News – Portugal: Police identify 27 who blocked work at future Boticas lithium mine”, AMAN, October 10, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.aman-alliance.org/Home/ContentDetail/107555. Lusa, “Lusa – Business News – Portugal: Lithium mine opponents block works, access”, AMAN, October 10, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.aman-alliance.org/Home/ContentDetail/107541.
[38] Erridge et al., “Social impacts”, 2, 5 and 8-11.
[39] Observatório Nacional da Desertificação, “População residente”, accessed September 23, 2026, https://desertificacao.pt/index.php/populacao-residente. Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, “Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 124/2003, de 28 de agosto”, Diário da República, no. 198/2003, series I, August 28, 2003, accessed September 23, 2026, https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/resolucao-conselho-ministros/124-2003-633275.
[40] Carlos Espírito Santo, “Cachão, uma aldeia abandonada!”, Diário de Trás-os-Montes, May 01, 2021, accessed August 26, 2026, https://www.diariodetrasosmontes.com/reportagem/cachao-uma-aldeia-abandonada.
[41] Empresa de Desenvolvimento Mineiro S.A., “Recuperação ambiental da área mineira de Jales”, accessed August 26, 2026, https://edm.pt/projetos/recuperacao-ambiental-da-escombreira-da-area-mineira-de-jales/.
[42] Agência Portuguesa do Ambiente, “AIA da ampliação da mina do Barroso – APA emite decisão ambiental favorável”, May 31, 2023, accessed September 23, 2026, https://apambiente.pt/sites/default/files/_A_APA/Comunicacao/Media/NotasOCS2023/NotaOCS_42-2023_AIA_MinaBarroso.pdf.
[43] European Commission, “2026 State of the Union”.
[44] European Commission, “2026 State of the Union”.
Picture credit: by Valerie Sirodova on pexels.com.
