Democratic Integrity in the Era of Digital Disinformation

Eduardo Paiva  (Master in Law and Informatics - UMinho) 
           

The healthy unfolding of democratic electoral processes – and of democratic life in general – has been threatened by the dissemination of disinformation (defined as “false or misleading content that is spread with an intention to deceive or secure economic or political gain, and which may cause public harm”) by agents who do not uphold the same principles.[1] Under these circumstances, a climate of manipulation and deceit is fostered, which is extremely and particularly malign for crucial moments of political decision,[2] as attempts are made to strip them of their inherent relevance and validity, constituting one of the most dangerous forces deteriorating our democratic foundations.[3]

 In this sense, the role of major digital platforms, as holders of vast power to control and influence communication and information channels on a global scale, is chronic and central in this issue. Taking this into account, they should be compelled to engage in self-criticism towards a certain openness in applying changes to the operational models of their businesses.[4] The enormous capacity of these technological platforms in amplifying and micro-targeting content makes them extremely attractive for the precise propagation of information on a large scale, thus making them systematically targeted for hybrid activities in the field of disinformation. Amidst this web of opaque information, it is more important than ever to know which profiles and posts are genuinely concerned with conveying the reality of facts in an impartial and well-founded manner.

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CJEU case law on ‘amnesties’: prospects for the Spanish amnesty on the Catalan independence conflict

Miryam Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano  (Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Seville) 
           

On 11 June 2024[1], the Spanish Official State Journal published Organic Law 1/2024, of 10 June, on amnesty for institutional, political and social normalisation in Catalonia (Ley Orgánica 1/2024, de 10 de junio, de amnistía para la normalización institucional, política y social en Cataluña).[2] The law entered into force at the same time of its publication. As of this date, it is mandatory for the judicial, administrative and accounting bodies that may be handling cases linked to the sovereignty process in Catalonia (2014-2017) to apply the law. The law orders these bodies to exempt from criminal, administrative or accounting liability those who have been involved in those events, especially those linked to the preparation or consequences of the consultations on independence that took place in 2014 and 2017.

The approval of this Spanish amnesty law has been preceded by some speculation about the position that the EU will adopt in relation to it, as well as others related to possible preliminary rulings: whether the Spanish courts could ask the CJEU for preliminary rulings before adopting their decision on the application of the amnesty law to each specific case. For this reason, it is relevant to recall what the EU’s position has been, to date, regarding amnesties approved in its Member States. But above all, it is important to find out whether the CJEU has previously ruled on the effectiveness of amnesty laws. This will provide basic guidance on whether the CJEU has jurisdiction over an amnesty law passed in a Member State and on the limits within which a Member State may decide to amnesty criminal, administrative and accounting liabilities.

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A matter of principle: the growth of the far right in the 21st century in the light of the structuring principles of the European Union

Ricardo Martins de Sousa e Silva (Master in Human Rights by UMinho) 
           

Once again in contemporary history, the far right occupies the centre of the European and world political scene. We see this in the growing popular support their political movements receive, in their growing ability to determine the themes of national and supranational political debates, as well as to influence the policies and way of doing politics of other political parties, and in their electoral growth, all over the world, but particularly in the Member States of the European Union (EU); either by becoming the main opposition parties, by becoming indispensable for the formation of governments, or by taking power, by forming governments themselves.[1] We also see this in the increase in politically motivated violence, whether it is symbolic violence, with the growth of hate speech[2] and the creation of an environment of insecurity for people on the political left and for ethnic, religious, sexual and gender minorities, or physical violence, with the increase in the number of attacks on members of those minorities. In these matters, Portugal is no exception.[3]

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Iris collection as a proof of personhood: current trends on biometric recognition

Maria Inês Costa (PhD Candidate at the School of Law of the University of Minho. FCT research scholarship holder – UI/BD/154522/2023) 
           

In Portugal, more than 300,000 people have already “sold” their iris scan to Worldcoin Foundation, which in return offers them cryptocurrency. In March 2024, the Portuguese data protection authority (hereinafter, the CNPD) decided to suspend the company’s collection of iris and facial biometric data for 90 days in order to protect the right to the protection of personal data, especially of minors, following in the footsteps of Spain, which also temporarily banned the company’s activities for privacy reasons.[1]

In a statement, the CNPD explains that the company has already been informed of this temporary suspension, which will last until the investigation is completed and a final decision is made on the matter. The adoption of this urgent provisional measure comes in the wake of “dozens of reports” received by the CNPD in the last month, which report the collection of data from minors without the authorisation of their parents or other legal representatives, as well as deficiencies in the information provided to data subjects, the impossibility of deleting data or revoking consent.[2] In CNPD’s press release, one can read that “[g]iven the current circumstances, in which there is unlawful processing of the biometric data of minors, combined with potential infringements of other GDPR rules, the CNPD considered that the risk to citizens’ fundamental rights is high, justifying an urgent intervention to prevent serious or irreparable harm.”[3]

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New digital manifestations of financial services and European integration: what benefits for the European citizen

Ana Filipa Machado Ribeiro (Student at the School of Law of the University of Minho | Winner of the 2023 UMinho Award for Undergraduate Research) 
           

Initial considerations

In an era where digital transformation is reshaping the financial landscape, the European Union (EU) has taken a pivotal step towards harmonising the burgeoning realm of crypto-assets with the introduction of the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulation. As we delve into the intricacies of the MiCA Regulation, it is essential to understand its objectives, the classification of crypto assets it covers, and the broader implications for European citizens and the digital economy at large. The following discussion offers a comprehensive exploration of the MiCA Regulation, also considering criticisms of the legislative adoption practised by the Union, while seeking to ascertain what advantages (if any) it offers European citizens.

MiCA – Statement of reasons

The EU has presented a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Crypto-assets – MiCA Regulation. This legislative proposal is part of the Digital Finance Package, understood by the EU itself as a set of measures that include a new strategy on digital finance for the EU financial sector,[1] aimed at promoting and supporting the potential of digital finance in terms of innovation and competition, while simultaneously mitigating inherent risks. Thus, the EU is prioritising the preparation of Europe for the digital age and creating a future-ready economy, serving its citizens.

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The EU Directive on violence against women and domestic violence – fixing the loopholes in the Artificial Intelligence Act

Inês Neves (Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Porto | Researcher at CIJ | Member of the Jean Monnet Module team DigEUCit) 
           

March 2024: a significant month for both women and Artificial Intelligence

In March 2024 we celebrate women. But March was not only the month of women. It was also a historic month for AI regulation. And, as #TaylorSwiftAI has shown us,[1] they have a lot more in common than you might think.

On 13 March 2024, the European Parliament approved the Artificial Intelligence Act,[2] a European Union (EU) Regulation proposed by the European Commission back in 2021. While the law has yet to be published in the Official Journal of the EU, it is fair to say that it makes March 2024 a historical month for Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’) regulation.

In addition to the EU’s landmark piece of legislation, the Council of Europe’s path towards the first legally binding international instrument on AI has also made progress with the finalisation of the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law.[3] As the EU’s cornerstone legislation, this will be a ‘first of its kind’, aiming to uphold the Council of Europe’s legal standards on human rights, democracy and the rule of law in relation to the regulation of AI systems. With its finalisation by the Committee on Artificial Intelligence, the way is now open for future signature at a later stage. While the non-self-executing nature of its provisions is to be expected, some doubts remain as to its full potential, given the high level of generality of its provisions, and their declarative nature.[4]

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The Italy–Albania Protocol on migration management: between new schemes of asylum externalisation and risks of systematic violations

Valentina Faggiani (Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at University of Granada) 
           

The trend towards the externalisation of migratory policy has been reaffirmed in the recent Italy–Albania Protocol, whose objective is to institute a new model. This Protocol aims at intervening to overcome a real problem: the systemic crisis of asylum that Italy is suffering. The idea that inspires it and the scheme are clear and have some original profiles: if the situation in the reception centres in Italy is unsustainable, why not transfer migrants in irregular situation and asylum seekers to reception centres instituted outside the Italian territory, but managed, controlled and financed by Italy? In this country, particularly in frontline areas such as Lampedusa, on the one hand, foreigners suffer serious and systematic violations of fundamental rights; on the other hand, there has been a strong feeling of uneaseamong the local population, who live in an unsafe environment characterised by the proliferation of criminality and situation of violence.

The idea has the characteristic of extrema ratio: the purpose of building a new model of migratory flux management. Regarding the innovation profiles, it is interesting to observe that in this case Italy does is not delegating, as it did in the Memorandum of Understanding with Libia, the liability for controlling the fluxes and for pushing back the migrants to their country of origin, but it assumes the management of all phases, and it extends the jurisdiction and the cost that it implies. It is a much more extensive and complex project. Indeed, the political and economic context of Albania apparently offers more guarantees than other countries.

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The New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum: from political (dis)agreements to a last chance

Inês Neves (Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Porto | Researcher at CIJ | Member of the Jean Monnet Module team DigEUCit ) and Rita Ferreira Gomes (Associate at Morais Leitão)
           

Setting the scene

From 2020 onwards, migration and asylum have been central to both national and European Union (‘EU’) political agendas. 2023, however, was key and ended with major challenges for 2024.

By the end of 2023, the European Parliament and the Council had reached a political agreement on several key proposals included in the (New) Pact on Migration and Asylum[1] (‘New Pact’), in particular, Proposals for Regulations: i) introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders[2] (‘Screening Regulation’); ii) on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’[3] (‘Eurodac Regulation’); iii) on a common procedure for international protection in the Union[4] (‘Asylum Procedures Regulation’); iv) on asylum and migration management[5] (‘Asylum Migration Management Regulation’), and v) addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum[6] (‘Crisis and Force majeure Regulation’).

Some question whether “the legislative proposals [will] have the same fate as the reform package that had been presented by the Commission in 2016[7]. Others see the New Pact as a final opportunity to get it right, or at least deserving of “a chance to succeed[8]. In her 2023 State of the Union speech, President von der Leyen referred to a “historic opportunity to get it over the line”, and compassionately, urged us all to get it done and prove that “Europe can manage migration effectively and with compassion[9].

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A specter is haunting Spain — the specter of illiberalism: A young democracy facing its ghosts

Rubén Díez (Professor of Sociology at Complutense University)
           

Populism shows a natural tendency to strain the independence of public functions, the autonomy of civil society and media, as well as the institutional mechanisms regulating the civil sphere in liberal democracies. Obama reminded us of this during the funeral of Republican John McCain in September 2018, implicitly referring to President Trump. A portion of Obama’s eulogy highlighted the rules and principles of rational-legal legitimization that govern our democracies. These include adherence to the duties and responsibilities of public office, as well as the norms regulating voting and the party system. Civil organizations, alongside the political class, must take responsibility for safeguarding these principles to prevent populism from taking root within their ranks and political entities. As Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt remind us in “How Democracies Die”, more essentialist forms of democracy—with demagogic speeches and leaders, populist organizations, plebiscitary practices, and Caesarism—civil institutions see a reduction in their mediating and arbitrating capacity for the multiplicity of material and ideal interests, hindering the expression of civil solidarity. The leader, party, or movement positions itself as the voice of the people, appealing to collective identities exclusively articulated in a binary key of belonging.

Illiberalism in its most extreme forms, especially when it seizes power, thrives by co-opting civil institutions and intermediate spaces. In addition, it silences or sidelines those who articulate alternative positions to its political project. This is achieved by subverting the law and discrediting dissenting voices often through the civil exclusion of discordant voices. If the ultimate expression of this idealized political project successfully materializes in a specific place and time, it opens the door for an anti-democratic populist project to crystallize. Some recent examples include traits of this ideal definition of illiberal scenarios: the leadership of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Law and Justice in Poland, the Brexit referendum in 2016, the declaration of independence in Catalonia in 2017, and the Trump administration in the USA. Sadly, a progressive and accelerated trend of democratic degradation may be observed in Spain as 2023 ends, following the formation of a new coalition government led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) with the support of left-wing populist, nationalist, and separatist forces.

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Beyond the Digital Markets Act: much more than a piece of legislation

Inês Neves (Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Porto | Researcher at CIJ - Centre for Legal Research | Member of the Jean Monnet Module team DigEUCit - A Digital Europe for Citizens. Constitutional and policymaking challenges) and Luísa Amaro de Matos (LL.M. in European Legal Studies – College of Europe, Bruges)
           

On 6 September 2023, the European Commission (‘EC’) designated a first set of six gatekeepers in relation to 22 core platform services(‘CPS’)[1]. These undertakings must ensure compliance with the positive and negative obligations set out in the Digital Markets Act (‘DMA’)[2] by March 2024.[3]

Meanwhile, the DMA is already having an impact, with Facebook and Instagram, for instance, offering European users ‘the choice’ to pay a monthly subscription to use their social networks without any advertising (ads).[4]

On 17 November 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) confirmed that Apple, Bytedance and Meta had brought actions challenging the designation of (some of) their core platform services,[5] namely Titktok as regards Bytedance (T-1077/23); Facebook Marketplace and Messenger concerning Meta (T-1078/23), and App Store and iMessage for Apple (Cases T-1079/23 & T-1080/23).

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